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Foreword 
The Centre for Rural Development (SLE) of Humboldt University’s Faculty of Life 
Sciences is known for its international project studies which are in equal shares 
applied and scientifically sound. Annually, 4 or 5 such studies on current issues of 
international development are produced by interdisciplinary teams. This format has 
proved very successful and the demand for such empirical studies is growing. To 
continue to meet this demand while facilitating SLE graduates’ entry into working life, 
the SLE has started to extend its service: We now conduct a new class of studies 
tailored to the needs and wishes of the contracting entity in terms of time, scope, and 
design. 
Acting as commissioner for this first study, KfW Development Bank demonstrates its 
confidence in SLE and our new class of studies. For this we wish to thank KfW and 
express our hope that the results have met its expectations. 
The new class of studies is characterised by shorter preparation phases at home and 
quicker data collection in the host country. Research assignments are carried out 
exclusively by SLE graduates and SLE-experienced team leaders, i.e. by teams that 
know the structure and approach of traditional SLE international project studies. This 
way, the skills taught and trained come to full fruition. As this first study shows it is 
indeed possible to speed up the working process without any loss in quality. We are 
thus able to reap the benefits of the SLE education in the truest sense of the word. 
As for contents, the paper at hand revolves around the effects of microfinance 
products on low-income households, a subject with which the SLE has dealt on 
several occasions. Building on an SLE study of 2012 that examined impacts of 
microfinance on economic empowerment, this new study investigates the relationship 
between microcredits and over-indebtedness while elaborating developing mitigation 
strategies. In this case, DRC serves as an exemplary for a number developing 
countries: it has strong economic growth, which entails great chances but also risks 
for the broad poor sections of its population.  
We hope you will find it an interesting read. 
Prof Dr Dr Frank Ellmer Dr Susanne Neubert 
Director of the Albrecht Daniel Thaer-Institute Director 
of Agricultural and Horticultural Sciences Centre for Rural Development 
Humboldt University of Berlin (SLE) 
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Executive Summary 
Background and reason for study 
Since 1999, the global financial sector targeting micro, small, and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs) has been affected by several crises of over-indebtedness (OID). Various 
factors that contributed to these crises similarly exist in the Congolese growth hubs, 
especially in the capital Kinshasa: Weak governance and institutions entail information 
deficits and a lack of regulation. An increase in the number of financial service 
providers (summarized as “financial institutions” or “FIs”), has led to intense 
competition for MSMEs that have little experience in formal financial services. 
To assess the risk of widespread OID in Kinshasa, the Humboldt University’s Centre 
for Rural Development (SLE) has conducted a study commissioned by KfW Entwick-
lungsbank and Advans Banque Congo. The study includes 1) an evaluation of the risk 
of an emerging OID crisis in Kinshasa; 2) an analysis of the factors – on the supply and 
the demand side – which may contribute to a growing risk of OID and 3) recommenda-
tions on how to reduce this risk and better manage existing OID. 
Theoretical concepts and research design 
The paper contributes to the ongoing debate on financial inclusion and its impacts on 
poverty reduction. In particular, it discusses the notion of FIs pursuing a “double bottom 
line” as well as negative effects of financial sector expansion, in particular the over-
indebting of borrowers. In sectors of financial inclusion in other countries, OID has 
been driven by factors on three levels: 1) practices on the supply side (creditors or 
lenders); 2) decision patterns on the demand side (borrowers or customers) and 
3) external factors (economic slumps, natural disasters, fragility). 
In the absence of a universal definition of OID, this study has reviewed key contributing 
factors of OID from recent literature and combined them to 19 indicators which form 
an early-warning index for OID (later referred to as OID index) on the macroeconomic, 
sectorial, and institutional front. These are individually assessed from 1 (lowest 
level/prevalence of early-warning signal for OID) to 10 (highest level) and then added 
together to form one global value. We also apply four qualitative and quantitative 
indicators to examine the duration of repayment problems, coping strategies to 
manage delays and consequences for borrowers who default on a debt. 
For this study, the research team used a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods. The core of the research is formed by 100 structured interviews with 
borrowers in default of payment, 30 semi-structured interviews with loan officers, as 
well as 40 interviews with branch managers and CEOs of financial institutions. We 
also carried out interviews and workshops with stakeholders such as members of 
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regulatory bodies, donor organizations, academia, and financial training centres. 
These interviews took place between January 15 and February 17, 2014. Results 
from field research were combined with existing literature on OID and data from the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX). 
Results 
The risk of over-indebtedness in Kinshasa 
The analysis of the 19 early-warning indicators of OID risk shows that the risk for 
Kinshasa is relatively high at 6.04 out of 10. The most important reasons for this 
alarming level are: 
• The lack of a functioning credit information system – which opens the doors to 
multiple borrowing and drives the FIs to negate banking secrecy and informally 
exchange customer information among each other to avoid signing bad 
borrowers; 
• Increasing productivity of loan officers (borrowers per officer) which may over-
stretch their capacities. This is a consequence of the sector’s growth and 
increasing competition between FIs; 
• The increase of some FIs’ portfolio at risk (PAR) which can indicate a 
deterioration of portfolio quality that can come with accentuated growth; 
• Inflexible loan requirements and lending methodologies which are hardly 
adapted to the context of vulnerability and economic uncertainty in which 
MSMEs operate. 
The OID index merely serves as an early-warning alarm signal – an OID crisis need 
not necessarily follow. It does however help to specify the most pressing actions 
necessary to lower the risk of OID and to facilitate sound financial sector development 
that is beneficial to both borrowers and creditors. 
Prevalence and degree of over-indebtedness in the sample 
In order to understand the situation of borrowers in default in Kinshasa, we 
approached financial service customers with a history of repayment problems via 
their creditors, i.e. the “FIs” (we use this term when we are speaking of: 1) financial 
inclusion banks, 2) MFIs or microfinance institutions and 3) cooperatives). In doing so 
we created a sample of borrowers most of whom have loans under 5,000 dollars and 
work in the trade sector. Interviewees were, for the most part, had experience in 
using financial services, and had been working in their current sector for more than 
seven years. 
The extent of OID in the sample was evaluated on the basis of the borrowers’ own 
perception, the duration of repayment problems, coping strategies applied and sacrifices 
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made in order to repay instalments, interest, and late fees. We also investigated the 
consequences of debt collection methods for borrowers. 
According to the OID index, 57 percent of borrowers in default have reached a 
serious or very serious level of OID: repayment problems have persisted for more 
than 30 days, interviewees consider themselves over-indebted and have given up 
meeting due dates. These individuals try to save money by eating less, taking their 
children out of school, and/or asking family members or others for money. Those who 
have employees terminate their employment or have stopped paying them. These 
borrowers are often traumatized by methods of debt collection and they fear loss of 
social status. 
The MSMEs that have fallen victim to OID on average received loans three times 
larger than those who were merely at risk of OID or not over-indebted. Those who 
received a smaller loan balance than requested and those who had multiple loans 
were more severely over-indebted. Loan balances which were raised automatically 
rather than on the basis of a sound borrower analysis from cycle to cycle further 
increased the risk of OID. Other factors examined - gender, level of education, 
household size, years of work experience, sector of work – did not influence the level 
of OID. 
Causes of over-indebtedness 
OID is a combination of factors that may reinforce each other: 
• Weak governance and weak institutions – exemplified by the lack of a function-
ing credit information system which has led to an information deficit on the 
side of lenders. Other examples of weak governance and institutions include 
weak infrastructure (electricity, transport), crime, and a state monopoly on 
insurances that de facto offers no protection against accidents or illnesses. 
The vulnerability created by this situation translates into very risky business 
practices on the part of borrowers (e.g. traveling with large amounts of cash). 
Micro-businesses in particular suffer from lack of protection against corruption 
(bureaucratic red tape, administrative burden). They have, for example, been 
most severely affected by the government’s “Kin Propre” campaign, an official 
campaign to eradicate informal petty commerce. 
• Lack of consumer protection: Analogous to the fragility of the state, certain 
reforms are not or only partially put into practice. The lack of a supervisory 
body for the financial sector and of rule of law causes methods of information 
exchange and of debt collection that are formally illegal. 
• Limited economic/financial leeway: The majority of MSMEs pursue buy-and-
resell strategies that bear little innovation. A strong degree of competition 
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between MSMEs combined with weak purchasing power strongly affects the 
80% of enterprises working in petty trade. Borrowers are unable to build up 
reserves. The unequal distribution of MSMEs between economic sectors is 
harmed by the fact that FIs only finance existing businesses and seem to 
prefer to lend to petty traders as opposed to other sectors. 
Practices on the side of financial service providers (FIs) may also contribute to OID: 
• The degree of competition between FIs: this creates a pressure on loan officers 
to expand their portfolio and reach growth targets, leaving less and less time 
for each individual borrower. The structural information deficit created by this 
situation rules out a complete analysis of a customer's credit-worthiness and 
can lead to the selection of “bad” borrowers. This effect is amplified by a lack 
of experienced loan officers. 
• Loan requirements and lending methodologies: these favour the selection of 
risk-seeking borrowers from a similar economic segment. This “adverse 
selection” has particularly negative effects for those borrowers who lack 
capacities to fully comprehend the costs of a loan or to pick and choose 
among different FIs. Lenders at the same time are reluctant to the risks of 
developing new products and loosening lending methodologies. 
• The rigidity of loan requirements and debt collection practices: Requirements 
and practices ignore the precariousness of borrowers’ livelihoods and can 
worsen repayment problems. The slightest economic downturn can be enough 
to throw borrowers off course. Defaulting is sanctioned through late fees, 
which adds to the borrower's inability to repay. In some cases, such adverse 
practices are exacerbated by abusive debt collection methods on the part of 
FIs. 
Socio-economic pressure, a chronic lack of capital, and a weak understanding of 
loan conditions and financial services can lead to bad choices by borrowers:  
• Over-indebted borrowers seem to have a poor understanding of financial services 
and of running a business, despite years of professional experience. Less 
than 10 percent have had an education in business management and 90 per-
cent could not name their monthly interest rate. FI information sessions are 
almost never repeated for subsequent cycles and the consequences of 
defaulting on a credit are unknown to almost 40 percent of borrowers. 
• FI representatives consider misuse or deviation of funds the primary reason 
for OID. One fifth of selected borrowers have not invested their loan as agreed 
with the creditor, 80 percent of those without informing the FI. Reasons for 
deviation include unexpected expenditures (e.g. illnesses) or alternative 
business opportunities that appeared more lucrative. In our sample, being 
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granted a credit smaller than expected contributed to borrowers investing in 
alternative activities or applying for a second credit elsewhere. 
• Despite the level of competition between FIs, borrowers seem to have little 
bargaining power. FIs determine conditions and payment schedules in a one-
size-fits-all approach. 
• Social pressure on borrowers can force them to disburse their loan among 
family members or their entourage. In an economically precarious environment 
this pressure can lead to deviation. 
Recommendations 
The Congolese Central Bank (BCC) has instructed FIs to better manage their PARs 
and in many cases the quality of the credit portfolio has improved. On all levels, 
initiatives to reduce the risk of OID have been implemented by different stakeholders. 
These best practices are in part included in the following recommendations, aimed at 
different levels of intervention. 
On the government level it is recommended to: 
• Launch the renewed credit information system along with a unique identification 
system (accompanied by an information campaign); 
• Develop norms for loan requirements and lending methodologies, indicators to 
evaluate borrowers and a minimum amount of information to be shared with 
customers; 
• Develop and apply an arbitration system to manage credit defaults and debt 
collection; 
• Standardize and publish market data for more transparency and independent 
monitoring of the sector; 
• Adapt the campaign “Kin Propre” in finding a socially acceptable way to 
regularize small businesses operating at the margins of formality; 
• Develop a national strategy for better financial literacy, abolish the state 
monopoly on insurances, and consider increasing the existing guarantee fund 
for loans. 
On the sectorial level, the quality of financial services must be managed to support 
consumer protection and a sustainable operation of FIs. Further recommendations 
are to: 
• Develop, disseminate and monitor the implementation of norms and standards 
of consumer protection as well as acceptable methods of debt collection; 
• Support standards of data collection and dissemination by FIs; 
• Develop and apply a campaign for financial literacy; 
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• Launch a debate on the FI’s social mission. Donors should consider tying their 
support to the pursuit of social goals and the implementation of standards. 
FIs must undergo institutional reform to improve loan officers’ and other employees’ 
performance. Some of the steps have already been put into practice: 
• Reduce the number of tasks each loan officer must fulfil and reform staff 
assessment; while ensuring continued training of loan officers; 
• Revise the system of customer analysis and assessment for a more 
comprehensive and realistic view of their economic situation; 
• Intensify customer support and incentivize MSMEs to take courses in 
management and accounting; 
• Mandate market research to open up new markets (regional, sectorial) and 
develop products tailored to customers; 
Training centres and associations could contribute to the development of a national 
strategy for financial literacy and the improvement of MSME management capacities. 
Support from donors could help increase their effectiveness. 
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1 Background of the study 
The relative stability marking the West and South of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo has allowed for a stable net economic growth for more than 10 years with 
recent economic growth rates exceeding 7 percent (2010-2012). An extension of the 
financial sector to segments of the population that were previously excluded (CIA 
2013) has further strengthened these positive economic developments. 
In its “Doing Business Report 2013” the World Bank has noted improvements in the 
Congolese business environment, among others, due to the state’s accession in 
2012 to the Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHABM). 
Though many bureaucratic obstacles persist and the country has a low rank in the 
global index for ease of doing business, recent reforms have facilitated business 
creation. These positive trends are, however, mostly restricted to Kinshasa and urban 
centres in North and South Kivu as well as Katanga (World Bank 2013, CIA 2013). 
Economic development in these dynamic areas has led to an increased offer of 
financial services by a growing number of FIs that have been pursuing financial 
inclusion (i.e. enabling access to finance to the large segment of the population 
currently excluded from financial services). In the DRC there are three basic types of 
institutions that provide these services: financial inclusions banks, microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) and cooperatives. More and more micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs) have access to financial services, a development enhanced by 
technological innovations like mobile banking, and the emergence of new actors in 
the areas of credit and electronic money transfer, including mobile phone operators. 
Throughout the past ten years, the international financial sectors targeting MSMEs 
(which includes microfinance) have witnessed several crises of over-indebtedness 
(OID) (2.1.2). These crises were particularly dramatic where market maturity and 
competition levels between providers were high. These risk factors were often 
combined with weak sector regulation and borrowers with little experience in managing 
formal credits. 
Several of these factors can be found in economic hubs of the DRC and especially in 
the capital Kinshasa: Little regulation and weak state institutions, information deficits, 
a lack of monitoring, expansion of, and competition between FIs (3.3.5) and a pool of 
borrowers unaccustomed to formal financial services. The main objectives of the 
study are to begin filling the gap of information on the risk and severity of OID in 
Kinshasa and to examine lending methodologies and the use of credits. 
With the aim of promoting the Congolese financial sector, KfW and Advans Banque 
Congo have commissioned this study to assess risk of OID as well as various factors 
on the side of creditors (supply) and borrowers (demand) that may reinforce the 
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dynamics of OID. For the Centre for Rural Development (SLE) of Berlin’s Humboldt 
University, this is the second study on the DRC’s financial inclusion sector, having 
conducted a study on “economic empowerment through access to microfinance 
products” in 2012 (Engel et al.). 
Despite promising economic growth rates, the DRC continues to rank among  
the most fragile states internationally and is unable to provide many public services 
(health, education, basic infrastructure, security). The occupation of Goma at the end 
of 2012 by M23, a national rebel militia, is a recent example of the country’s 
continued instability, particularly in eastern provinces. 
Ranking 186th (second to last) on the Human Development Index (HDI, 2012),  
the country remains one of the poorest worldwide. However, certain positive  
changes can be noted: in 2012 the value of the DRC’s HDI grew by  
2.2 percent compared to 2011, a growth rate almost twice that of the  
sub-Saharan average (1.3 percent). The country’s GDP per capita has  
also been steadily growing for ten years. 
These developments have so far had little impact on the living conditions of  
the majority of people: a staggering 88 percent of the DRC’s population live on  
less than 1.25 USD a day and 71 percent remain below the national poverty 
threshold. Life expectancy is 48.7 years and gender inequality remains extreme: 
DRC takes one of the last places in the UNDP’s Gender-related Development  
Index (2013). 
1.1 Hypotheses 
Based on existing literature on OID and available information on Kinshasa’s financial 
sector we developed research questions and four working hypotheses to be 
examined in the field: 
• Due to the expansion of financial services in Kinshasa, credits have become 
more and more easily accessible for MSMEs; 
• Competition between FIs has led to lending methodologies and loan require-
ments that in part lack careful analysis on the side of FIs; 
• Information deficits and competition between FIs prevent information exchange 
between these institutions and promote multiple borrowing; 
• The lack of an effective credit information system tempts borrowers to demand 
credits without sustainable business plans. As a consequence, credits often 
exceed borrowers’ ability to repay. 
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1.2 Results and objectives 
Three specific objectives set by the research team are reflected in three concrete 
results (Figure 1). The paper contributes to an overall objective: to strengthen the 
sector of financial inclusion in its social and economic dimensions so that MSMEs 
and poor households may access appropriate and reliable financial services. In order 
to reach these objectives the team analysed: 
• The prevalence of OID in the financial sector targeting MSMEs in Kinshasa. 
This analysis is based on early-warning signals for OID (result 1) ; 
• Factors on the supply side (FIs or lenders) that can exacerbate OID (result 2); 
• Factors on the demand side (MSMEs or borrowers) which promote OID. 
Reasons for seeking multiple loans and for defaulting on a loan form part of 
the analysis (result 3). 
Figure 1:  Overview of results and objectives of the study 
 
 
These three results help us develop recommendations on the national, sectorial, and 
institutional level. Recommendations in turn aim to better calibrate financial services, 
to refine criteria to assess and select borrowers, to reduce the overall risk of OID and 
to ensure a better consumer protection.  
 
R1: Prevalence 
of OID in 
Kinshasa
•Data from FIs
•Information 
from 
regulatory 
bodies and 
relevant 
institutions
R2: Analysis of 
supply side
•Creditor 
practices
•Mechanisms 
for consumer 
protection
•Financial 
sector 
development
R3: Analysis of 
demand side
•Agendas and 
practices of 
borrowers
•Dynamics 
leading to OID
•Strategies for 
debt 
repayment
Output:
•Review of OID 
early-warning 
index
•Review of 
critera to 
assess and 
select 
borrowers
•Information 
needed for 
succesful credit 
management
Impact
DRC's financial 
system is 
strengthened in 
its social and 
economic 
dimensions
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2 Theoretical concepts and research design 
The theoretical concept and the research design are based on an analysis of the 
existing literature on financial inclusion (2.1) and of the problem of OID which has 
recurred in different sectors since 2008 (2.2). Section 0 in the Annex gives an 
overview of the literature on financial inclusion and OID. 
2.1 Schools of thought – 
from microcredits to financial inclusion 
Beginning in Bangladesh in the 1970s with small loans to groups of poor women 
deemed unworthy of credit by banks, microcredits have grown considerably in size, 
scope and diversity. Around 10,000 FIs now serve 200 million borrowers in more than 
100 countries. The most successful FIs have annual growth rates of over 20 percent 
and a repayment rate of 99 percent. During the 1990s, micro-savings, transfers and 
insurance were included in portfolios, which led to the terminological shift from 
“microcredits” to “microfinance”. 
This name change came with a shift towards less poor households and the creation 
of commercial financial institutions. At least since 2007, there have been increasing 
numbers of negative reports on microfinance both in the media and academia, 
culminating in the 2010 reports of borrowers committing mass-suicides in Andhra 
Pradesh, India (CGAP 2010; Wichterich 2012; section  2.2.2). Once considered the 
magic bullet to end poverty, microfinance (and its claimed reconciliation of economic 
and social goals) has become an increasingly controversial issue (Lelart 2003; Aiyai 
2010 ; Lascelles 2011). 
2.1.1 Debates on the impact of microfinance 
Microfinance advocates point to positive effects both direct (increased income and 
well-being, economic and social empowerment) and indirect (job creation, increased 
well-being of borrower’s entourage). Microcredits can generally smoothen consumption 
and improve risk management (Aggarwal et al. 2012; Morduch 1999; Robinson 
2001). 
In regions where microcredits have less impact, supporters are quick to point out 
conditions specific to that context, e.g. precarious livelihoods or market saturation 
(Gehlich 2008). They claim that even if not a magic bullet, microfinance can, under 
the right conditions, reduce the poor’s vulnerability to external shocks, ensure a 
steady income, increase savings and promote human development (Ndongo 2012). 
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Opponents to microfinance believe that loans drive borrowers to OID as they are 
unable to fully comprehend the repayment conditions and meet the high interest 
rates. They underline the inherent problems of “moral hazard” (information deficits 
lead to opportunistic behaviour) and “adverse selection” (good borrowers must pay 
the price, i.e. interest rates, for bad borrowers), which are widely recognized but 
remain unresolved (Batabayal et Beladi 2010 ; Sengupta 2008; Simtowe et al. 2007).  
Critics question microfinance’s ability to empower women as it is most common in 
places where men exercise control over the household income and thus over loan 
use. Also, microfinance’s ability to increase productivity is called into question. 
According to Muhammad (2013), only 5-10 percent of funds are invested in a 
productive manner, i.e. for durable goods. The rest is used to cover consumption 
needs, medical expenses, education and other non-performing assets or “temptation 
goods” (Banerjee et al. 2009; Rahman 2007b). Furthermore, microfinance’s impact 
on political, social and economic empowerment remains to be proven (Goetz et 
Gupta 1996; Engel et al. 2012). Even if in some cases, microfinance increases 
household income, the best microcredit cannot substitute social policy, political 
reform, and development programs, critics argue. 
For a long time the controversy surrounding microfinance was perpetuated by a lack 
of robust studies (Armendariz et Morduch 2010; Zeller et Meyer 2002). In recent 
years, however, several randomized controlled trials have shown that microcredits 
have a slight positive effect, if only for borrowers with a propensity to become 
business owners. In other words: Microcredits cannot teach people how to run a 
business (Aggarwal et al. 2012; Crépon et al. 2011; Banerjee et al. 2009).  
2.1.2 Recent developments 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis after 2008, investors were on the lookout 
for new, safe investment opportunities while FIs, in light of an ever-increasing 
demand for financial services, were in need of capital beyond what donors and their 
own savings accounts could offer. This led to a boom in microfinance investment 
vehicles or MIVs. While most sectors were negatively affected by the financial crisis, 
the total assets of the 10 largest microfinance funds increased by almost 30 percent 
in 2008 and 2009 (Gähwiler et Nègre 2011; Batabayal et Beladi 2010).  
In 2010, two of the largest MFIs, SKS from India and BancoSol from Bolivia went 
public. Micro-investment funds were regarded as the most dynamic segment in 
finance with high repayment rates and little risk. Critics, however, see the initial public 
offerings as a blatant example of “mission drift” (Bateman 2011), mixing concerns for 
poverty reduction and development with commercial interests. For example, the OID 
crisis in India is seen as a logical consequence of the microfinance boom, of the 
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commercialization of poverty and unchecked growth (Kannabiran 2005; Wichterich 
2012).  
The continuing growth of microfinance raises the question of whom it should serve: 
“the working poor and marginally poor” or the “extremely poor”? Morduch (1999) 
calculated that investing one dollar in a poor person yields increases in income five 
times higher than investing in the marginally poor. Therefore, MFIs should target the 
extremely poor instead of pursuing economic sustainability at all costs. This finding is 
contested by Hulme and Mosley (1996) who show that a borrower’s income 
increases proportionally to his/her starting level of income: The more money the 
borrower has to begin with, the more effective the loan. 
The levels of interest rates in microfinance are another source of controversy. While 
microcredits have in many places replaced local moneylenders (with interest rates of 
100-300 percent per year), MFI interest rates are much lower, but still twice as high 
as interest rates of microfinance banks1. This is a consequence of the smaller 
average loan balance of micro-borrowers which result in higher administrative costs 
per loan. Evidently, the poor pay more to borrow money than the wealthy do (Cull et 
al. 2009).  
Proponents of market-based interest rates argue that poor borrowers are indeed 
capable of paying higher interest rates due to the law of diminishing returns. They 
fear that government restrictions in interest rates will prevent capital from flowing to 
the most promising projects in terms of economic returns (Aggarwal et al. 2012). In 
addition, MFIs with the highest interest rates have proven to be the best performers 
among FIs: these are cost-effective and financially sustainable and use the 
accumulated capital to ensure their own continuity, thus increasing the impact on the 
poor (Robinson 1996; Conning 1999). Furthermore, proponents of market based-
interest rates describe such interest rates as a rationing mechanism, meaning that 
those who are willing to pay the most for capital also have the most worthy projects 
(Armendariz & Morduch 2010). The combination of repayment rates of over 90 
percent and high interest rates in microfinance (50 percent annually are normal) has 
puzzled many scholars (Sengupta 2008; Lascelles 2011). 
For many scholars, microfinance has the potential to positively change the economic 
position of the poor all around the world and donors have spent billions of dollars on 
the promotion of microfinance projects. Given these investments, studies to show the 
return per dollar are needed (i.e. income increase of target group per donor dollar). 
Even though its impact on poverty reduction remains to be proven, it seems that 
                                            
1  A global survey shows that the median average interest rate is 25 percent for NGOs, 20 percent for 
non-bank financial institutions and 13 percent for banks. On average, commercial microfinance 
banks grant loans four times higher than NGOs (Armendariz & Morduch 2010). 
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microfinance continues to play an important role for the Global South. It has changed 
millions of lives even if its “promise” of financial independence is still far from being 
realized in many areas. Its largest potential seems to lie on the African continent 
where less than one percent of the economically active use microcredits and the 
large majority remains excluded from financial services. To serve this market requires 
capital beyond what donors and governments can offer. But before investing more 
funds, one should first analyse the apparent problems relating to microfinance 
(Ledgerwood 2000). 
2.2 Over-indebtedness 
The global financial crisis demonstrated the importance of responsible financial 
services. The microfinance industry’s evolution including several recent OID crises in 
different countries have added to the fear that loans could turn into a burden for 
many borrowers. Considering that the current loan portfolio of all FIs is around 72 
billion dollars, OID can be considered as one of the industry’s most threatening risks 
(Lascelles & Mendelson 2012). 
Many stakeholders consider OID as a symptom for other deficiencies of the sector. In 
seeking growth and profits, FIs tend to grant more capital than the market can 
absorb. Since 1999, OID crises have hurt borrowers in very different markets, e.g. 
India, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Morocco, Nicaragua (Kappel et al. 2010 ; Chen et 
al. 2010), with negative consequences for all stakeholders involved: 
• Investors and FIs who are interested in their turnaround, 
• Donors who have engaged in the sector and are worried about its image, i.e. 
its positive economic and social impacts, 
• Borrowers whose vulnerability is increased by OID. On the material front, OID 
can translate into less purchasing power and lower demand, late fees, seizure 
of collateral, a spiral of debt and insolvability. On the social level, OID can lead 
to a loss of social status, and at the individual level to mental and physical 
health problems. In extreme cases, hopelessness and anxiety have driven 
borrowers to commit suicide. 
In order to improve the offer in financial inclusion and to reduce the OID risk it is 
important to understand the different causes and episodes leading to OID. 
2.2.1 Definition 
Despite the urgency of the subject, there is no universal definition of the term “over-
indebtedness”. Determining at which point an individual is considered over-indebted 
depends on the type of assets he/she commands, while indebtedness in general is 
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measured in terms of liquidity and lack thereof. There are various approaches to 
measure OID of borrowers in financial inclusion. While some only count the number 
of borrowers who have defaulted, a more commonly used measurement is the size of 
the portfolio at risk for more than 30 or 90 days (PAR30 or PAR90) 2. Whereas the 
level of the PAR30 across microfinance sectors was 2 percent in 2004, it had 
reached 7 percent by 2009 in Bosnia, 10 percent in Morocco, 12 percent in 
Nicaragua and 13 percent in Pakistan (Viada & Gaul 2012). Critics of using PAR30 
as a measurement for OID argue that OID already starts some time before borrowers 
actually default on payment.  
There are also approaches which refer to the ability to repay as a measurement of 
OID (Kappel et al. 2010). A household’s level of OID is measured through the debt-
to-income ratio, i.e. the borrower’s monthly instalments in relation to monthly income 
to see how significantly repayment puts a dent in their income:  
 total monthly instalments on household debt  
(total monthly gross income of the household – total monthly expenses) 
 
Once the resulting value passes a certain threshold (60% or 75% in most studies), 
indebtedness turns into OID. It is striking that actors in Kinshasa‘s financial sector 
seem to use the term OID mainly when they speak about borrowers with multiple 
loans and only secondly when describing someone’s inability to repay.  
All the above mentioned approaches for measuring OID are limited in their ability to 
capture the full picture of OID. This is why more recent studies have resorted to a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative definitions of OID, using both the objective 
debt-to-income ratio and the subjectively perceived burden of OID. 
Due to the lack of reliable quantitative data on debt-to-income ratios, in this study we 
use a qualitative definition to identify over-indebted borrowers: “A microfinance 
customer is over-indebted if he/she is continuously struggling to meet due dates and 
has to make unduly high sacrifices related to his/her loan obligations that have more 
than transitory effects (Schicks 2010: 7).” 
This definition includes cases in which loans are repaid but at the price of eating less, 
selling household goods, taking out loans with secondary sources or foregoing to pay 
school fees, to name a few examples. We thus take into account the borrower’s 
perspective. The advantage of this definition lies in its ability to simultaneously 
consider objective indicators like credit default and subjective ones like borrowers’ 
self-assessment. In doing so, our definition goes beyond purely quantitative cash-
                                            
2  PAR: standard international measure of portfolio quality that measures the portion of a portfolio 
which is deemed at risk because payments are overdue. 
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flow analyses which are often based on imprecise quantitative estimations. At the 
same time, one must take into the account the drawbacks of this definition, such as 
the strong bias of individual perspectives which are hard if not impossible to verify. 
For this study’s threshold of OID see section 4.1. 
2.2.2 Factors leading to over-indebtedness 
According to the relevant literature, multiple factors contribute to OID: the role of 
lenders in driving microfinance customers into over-indebtedness, borrowers’ own 
actions, and certain external influences which may exacerbate the problems. 
Figure 2:  Factors leading to over-indebtedness 
Source: Schicks 2010: 15 
 
Oftentimes lenders’ actions can exacerbate borrower OID. Today’s sectors of financial 
inclusion, which are driven by aggressive marketing, tend to encourage a continuous 
increase of loan balances and expose borrowers to risks when their ability to repay 
has not been sufficiently analysed. Loan officers lack incentives to communicate in 
detail the costs and modalities of loans which would allow borrowers to make more 
rational decisions. Inflexible payment schedules and abusive debt collection further 
contribute to the risk of borrowers becoming unable to repay their loans (Figure 3). 
As for borrower actions, we cannot necessarily assume a rational-choice model: Social 
and economic pressures or little understanding of credit obligations lead to bad 
choices. Experiences from other studies show that the tendency to become over-
indebted depends on certain socio-demographic and economic traits.  
At the same time, actors are subject to circumstances beyond their power. These 
external factors include the institutional and economic environment as well as 
external shocks like natural disasters or violent conflicts. Insufficient institutional and 
legal protection, particularly for micro-borrowers, or external shocks can quickly 
External factors 
- Adverse shocks 
- Institutional environment 
(e.g. macroeconomic or 
legal) 
Lender behaviour 
- Marketing and growth focus 
- Inflexible products 
- Lending procedures/ 
collections 
 
Borrower behaviour 
- Cognitive and 
psychological biases 
- Sociological influences 
- Socio-demographic/ 
economic attributes  
OID as a 
consequence of 
interacting factors 
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render a borrower’s debt insurmountable. All these factors are correlated with the 
specific context. For instance, the political movements of non-repayment in 
Nicaragua and Pakistan took place at the height of the global financial crisis of 2008, 
exacerbating the OID crisis (Viada & Gaul 2012). These examples illustrate how each 
situation of over-indebtedness is the result of multiple interacting factors and requires 
thorough analysis.  
Figure 3:  Functional chain of over-indebtedness 
 
 
OID at its worst: The Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis in India 
The Andhra Pradesh OID crisis is often cited as an example to point out the dangers 
inherent to financial inclusion. The region saw a strong expansion of microfinance 
operations between the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, a government programme 
supported self-help groups in accessing the financial sector. The commercially run 
microfinance sector grew rapidly and the total loan portfolio increased by 46% between 
2009 and 2010 alone. To reach their market targets, the FIs granted multiple loans 
and focussed on credits while neglecting other services like savings. The combination 
of these factors proved disastrous. In October 2010 alone there were reports of 50 
microcredit borrowers committing suicide as they could no longer take the pressure 
of debt and brutal debt collection practices  
(Taylor 2014). 
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On the international scale, there are efforts to put in place a process of certifying FIs 
who respect customer protection. Since 2013, the Smart Campaign established a 
code of conduct for internationally operating institutions including measures for 
consumer protection. The campaign enables assessments conducted by a third party 
to promote good conduct of FIs. Also, the Universal Standards for Social Performance 
Management (USSPM), adopted by the Social Performance Task Force (SPTF), 
presents a collection of management standards for FIs devoted to the double bottom 
line. 
Give the growing risk of OID, risk indicators must be identified and observed carefully. 
There are already several different indices of early-warning signs for OID. In this 
study, we chose to use an index developed by the University of Zurich and its Centre 
for Microfinance (Kappel et al. 2010 – referred to henceforth as “Zurich”). For the 
purpose of this study, the index was adjusted to the context of Kinshasa (3.2). 
2.3 Research methods 
To collect data in Kinshasa, the research team used both quantitative and qualitative 
methods and spoke to a broad range of interviewees (Table 1). Research findings 
were analysed as described in the above-mentioned model for interacting OID factors 
(Figure 1). Interviews took place between January 15 and February 17, 2014. 
In total, around 40 semi-structured interviews were carried out with experts and FI 
branch managers. These interviews form part of a qualitative content analyse that 
also included interviews with loan officers and narrative interviews with borrowers. 
The goal of the analysis is to better understand causalities and reasons behind OID.  
Structured interviews with customers and loan officers carried out for this study were 
part of a descriptive data analysis to test the previously stated hypotheses. Other 
questions asked in structured interviews further provided data for an exploratory 
analysis to discover reasons for OID that weren’t considered in the hypotheses. 
Structured questionnaires for customers were based on experiences made by the 
SLE team during their research in the DRC in 2012 (Engel et al.).  
A team of four Congolese students of economy and microfinance assisted in the field 
research. The questionnaires were reviewed and adapted following test interviews 
with borrowers. The research design was discussed during a kick-off presentation to 
fine-tune research methods in accordance with feedback and arguments from 
stakeholders. 
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Table 1: Overview of data collection 
Source and type of 
interview 
Approach, objectives and interviewees  
101 structured 
interviews with 
customers listed in 
the PAR of 6 FIs 
(MFIs, cooperatives, 
banks) and 2 focus 
groups discussions 
(FGDs) 
• Analysis of structured (descriptive data analysis) and semi-
structured questionnaires (open questions) 
• Selection of customers with the aid of FIs in 15 of 24 districts of 
Kinshasa 
• Interviews conducted in the field in the absence of the loan 
officer; anonymity guaranteed; use of information explained to 
interviewees;  
• 2 FGD with potential customers. 
 Borrowers 
17 narrative 
interviews with 
customers and their 
loan officers 
• 15 narrative interviews to better understand reasons behind OID 
• Interviews with loan officers to triangulate information 
 Lenders 
32 semi-structured 
interviews with 
sector experts 
 
Representatives from 
• Congolese central bank (BCC) 
• International organisations (PASMIF, IFC) 
• Supportive structures to the sector (FPM, FI associations) 
• FIs (commercial banks, microfinance banks, MFIs, cooperatives) 
• Training centres 
• Businesses 
 External factors, lenders, borrowers 
3 FGDs • 3 FGDs with loan officers 
• Semi-structured discussions 
 Lenders 
33 structured 
interviews and  
11 semi-structured 
with loan officers of 
6 FIs 
• Quantitative and qualitative data 
• Methods of borrower selection,  
• Lending and debt collection methodologies, loan requirements 
• Duties and views of loan officers 
 Lenders 
8 semi-structured 
interviews with 
agency directors and 
supervisors 
• 8 interviews with heads of agencies and supervisors 
• Better understanding of the FI perspective (challenges, 
competition) 
 Lenders 
6 expert workshops 
(3 in Kinshasa,  
2 in Berlin,  
1 in Frankfurt) 
• Presentation and discussion of approach and results 
• Development of recommendations 
 External factors, lenders, borrowers 
Secondary sources 
(MIX, annual 
reports, publications, 
global indices) 
• Triangulation of statements with economic data 
• Global context of financial inclusion and OID 
 External factors, lenders, borrowers 
14 Theoretical concepts and research design 
 
2.4 Limits and scope of the study 
The study examines the risk of OID in Kinshasa and the prevalence and degree of 
OID among the sample. It analyses reasons contributing to repayment problems on the 
supply and demand side. Based on this analysis, the authors make recommendations 
to reduce the OID risk and improve consumer protection. As a limiting factor, it is 
important to recognize that OID is a sensitive subject for all parties involved and 
statements made by study participants can thus be biased for different reasons: 
• For the FIs, news of an increase in their PAR ratio and default rates can deteriorate 
their market position. They take actions against the defaulting borrowers to absorb 
losses and to encourage others to respect loan conditions. There are FIs that 
neither wish to provide information on this subject nor to organise interviews with 
customers. In the sample there is thus a problem of self-selection of FIs and 
borrowers willing to discuss the problems - it is likely that these do not include the 
worst cases. 
• The team had asked the most important FIs in Kinshasa for raw data on 
customers who are in default of payment. With one exception, the FIs did not 
provide this information, probably to avoid internal information getting to their 
competition and to avoid the effort of compiling information. 
• The loan officers are assessed based on their loan portfolio and a borrower’s 
repayment discipline can draw attention to the performance of his/her loan officer. 
Even though the cooperation with loan officers was for the most part constructive, 
it is possible that our assessment method created a bias in the sample selection. 
• Even though we explained to all interviewees that we do not work for FIs and that 
their statements are anonymised, it is likely that certain participants perceived the 
research team as FI representatives and thus gave false information. Financial 
data (balance sheets of banks, cooperatives, and MFIs) was not easily accessible 
and annual reports and MIX data were often incomplete. Our repeated requests 
for more data were in vain. 
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3 Assessment of the risk of over-indebtedness 
Until now, OID crises of financial sectors became apparent only when cases of 
individual OID were widespread. A system of early-warning indicators is needed in 
order to take preventive measures before a crisis breaks out (Mommartz et al. 2010). 
3.1 Early-warning index 
The above-mentioned Zurich study developed a methodology to establish an early-
warning index for OID. This index encompasses 14 indicators to assess signs for an 
OID crisis. Among others, the authors ascertain a lack of quantitative data for the 
sector of financial inclusion. Consequently, such an index can only serve as an 
approximation and not every country classified as “at risk” will experience a crisis. 
Still, when markets show increasing levels of early-warning signs, the index can help 
guide actors in taking preventative actions to avoid OID. The Zurich study uses a 
“signalling approach” (Mommartz et al. 2010) in order to measure various variables 
that are likely to show significant changes in the beginning of an OID crisis. The 
index’s 14 indicators for assessing signs of an OID crisis are derived from these 
variables. 
For the purpose of this study, the Zurich index is adapted to the context of Kinshasa. 
Five indicators elaborated but finally omitted by Zurich were re-examined and 
selected based on their significance for the context at hand. In addition we examined 
indicators used by Rotter (2012) to measure the OID risk in Mozambique and 
adapted them where applicable. 
The financial sector targeting MSMEs has been described as ill-adapted to the context 
of the DRC. In order to account for the DRC’s specific fragile context, we have 
included macro-level indicators (even if most remained stable in recent years). The 
result is a list of 19 ada,pted indicators. Each indicator was assessed according to its 
prevalence in Kinshasa and given a value on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 representing 
the lowest and 10 representing the highest level of prevalence. The results are 
calculated in a first approach by using equal weights for each indicator (1/19 or 0,053) 
and, in a second, by emphasizing those variables that are considered particularly 
influential for OID in the literature and by experts. In this case, 5 indicators have been 
weighted twice as high as the 14 others, (namely Development of PAR ratios; Quality 
and use of credit information system; Loan requirements and lending methodologies; 
Productivity; Multiple lending/borrowing). Based on Zurich, the study distinguishes 
four categories of indicators, as the left column of the following table shows:  
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Table 2:  Categories of indicators for OID risk 
Macro-level indicator GDP per capita growth 
Remittances 
Political/economic stability 
Corruption 
Industry-level indicator Market penetration 
Growth rate of total loan portfolios 
Development of PAR ratios 
Quality and use of credit information system 
Perceived commercial bank involvement  
Perceived level and trends in competition 
Perceived investment flows 
FI liquidity 
Firm-level indicator Average loan balance per borrower 
Loan requirements and lending methodologies 
Productivity (borrowers per staff member) 
Range of loan products 
Growth and market targets 
Multiples loans 
Consumer lending 
Household-level 
indicator 
Chapters 4 & 5 
Based on Zurich (2010) 
 
We are not able to specify which of the levels plays the leading role for OID on a 
global scale (Zurich 2010). One must rather analyse case by case which indicators 
dominate the OID risk in specific contexts. Apart from the macro-level, industry-level 
and firm-level, the household-level indicators (i.e. borrowers or MSMEs) influence the 
risk of OID.  
3.2 Macro-level indicators 
This section examines macro-level (framework) conditions such as GDP growth and 
fragility of the state. 
3.2.1 GDP per capita growth 
“The number of traders has increased in recent years. (…) These past months, 
everyone was in tears: with the country’s economic downturn no one is buying 
products, not even clothes”  
(Nar2). 
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The first indicator tested for its influence on OID is GDP per capita growth. Times of 
economic recession are often accompanied by reduced demand for goods and 
services – which diminishes revenues and profits of MSMEs while their debt and 
costs of living remain the same. This growing gap between income on the one side, 
debt and expenditures on the other, increases the risk of OID. As the figure below 
shows, the GDP growth in the DRC has been over 5 percent every year for a decade 
with the exception of 2009 which marked the beginning of the global financial crisis. 
In 2013 the (estimated) GDP growth even reached 7.5 percent (World Bank). The 
relative increase of the GDP and the size of the Congolese financial sector indicate a 
dynamic environment with increasing demand for loans in Kinshasa. 
Figure 4:  Annual GDP growth rates in DRC 
 
Source: Global Finance 2013 
 
Two main factors particularly contributed to the strong economic growth, these are: a) 
the extremely low starting level (“take-off effect”): even in 2012 the DRC’s GDP was 
27.5 billion dollars, the equivalent of 1 percent of France’s GDP (IMF 2012) and b) 
the strong global demand for natural resources which make up a large part of the 
DRC’s exports and significantly contribute to the country’s GDP. There are no 
particular statistics for Kinshasa but being the country’s economic hub, its growth rate 
should be assumed to be even higher than the national average. 
GDP growth provides no information on wealth distribution within a population and 
hence cannot be taken as a measure for a country’s overall poverty reduction; of 
which clearly the lower segments in financial inclusion profit more, i.e. there is pro-
poor growth (Klasen 2004).  
As Figure 5 shows, the annual GDP per capita in the DRC remained below 400 dollars 
between 2003 and 2012 (CIA World Fact Book 2013 ; according to the World Bank, it 
was only 230 dollars in 2012). This is a low value even in comparison with other sub-
Saharan African countries, which average 1,350 dollars. 
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Figure 5: Ten-year overview: Level of GDP per capita in DRC (PPP) 
 
Sources: WDI 2013, IndexMundi 2013 
 
Even a short-term decrease in purchasing power and demand for goods and services 
can have a negative impact on borrowers of which 80 percent work in petty trade. 
Revenues are low and the slightest decrease in demand can have serious conse-
quences. In the absence of social security, traders’ resilience depends entirely on 
their own daily revenue. Particularly for micro and small businesses a lack of revenue 
translates into having to make sacrifices within their households. For medium enter-
prises, lower revenue “merely” translates into the dismissal of employees and shutting 
down of stores. In these circumstances the need to repay can be push the borrower 
irreversibly into debt (Nar2, WS4). 
As explained above, despite strong economic growth, the DRC’s GDP per capita 
remains at an extremely low level. Lack of financial resilience and purchasing power 
on the side of borrowers can then quickly lead to OID. In view of this conflicting 
evidence (high GDP growth rate but low level of GDP per capita), the impact of GDP 
per capita on the risk of OID is medium, with a value of 6 on our OID risk scale from  
1 to 10. 
3.2.2 Remittances 
Remittances are a typical source of income in many low-income countries. The inflow 
of capital can smoothen income flows and lower the risk of OID. On the other hand, 
remittances can reduce dependence on local lenders and lower the willingness and 
effort to repay loans as they offer other, cheaper sources of capital. As the following 
figure shows, the emigration rate of the DRC is below that of other large sub-Saharan 
African countries. Due to low emigration rates, remittances generally do not play an 
important role in the Congolese economy. 
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Figure 6:  Number of annual emigrations to OECD countries 
 
Source: OECD 2013 
 
This assumption was confirmed in the interviews. Money transfers are mainly used 
for domestic transactions, i.e. to transfer funds between provinces and cities 
(especially between Kinshasa and Lubumbashi). According to interviewees, this 
money is often directly spent on real estate or household consumption. Transferred 
money is only rarely used to substitute credits as a means of investment or for 
repayment. The number of money transfer agencies in the DRC has doubled since 
2012 but numbers of people actually using financial transfer services remain low, 
particularly in comparison with Eastern Africa and its M-Pesa system (Exp4; Exp5; 
Exp11). Money transfer agencies are only filled with customers around the holidays. 
As remittances seem to play a minor role in the Congolese economy, we attribute a 
low prevalence to this early-warning indicator of OID (prevalence of 2). 
3.2.3 Political & economic stability 
According to studies on OID, politically and economically unstable countries are more 
easily affected by OID crises. Until today, the DRC remains among the most fragile 
countries in the world (Fund for Peace 2014; WGI 2013; chapter 0). Political 
instability reduces individuals’ planning horizons and affects one’s ability to repay. 
Economic instability increases the need to finance consumption by running into debt 
and to deceive FIs regarding one’s economic situation (Gonzalez 2008). This 
situation breeds mutual distrust between the regulatory bodies, FIs, and borrowers. 
Furthermore, situations of instability undermine legal mechanisms in a country. This 
again creates mistrust between borrowers and lenders, as there are no more legal 
channels to hold each other to account in case credit default. Overall, instability in a 
country thus creates an environment of uncertainty. 
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In Kinshasa, the majority of interviewed borrowers mentioned that they face severe 
income fluctuations between months. In our sample, monthly income differences had 
a factor of 2.4, meaning that a given individual, for example, reported an income of 
480 dollars in a good month and 200 dollars in a bad month; chapter 5.2). This 
situation is unfavourable for the realisation of financial inclusion on the large scale. 
For FIs and borrowers, the primary problems in lending and borrowing, which relate 
to the DRC’s state of instability, are legal uncertainty and economic vulnerability, 
respectively. Furthermore, as shown in chapter 4.2 fragility, a lack of infrastructure as 
well as repressive actions by law enforcers (e.g. in the case of “Kin Propre”) are other 
important causes for credit default. On the whole, all these factors influence the 
framework conditions under which lenders and borrowers operate and thus have a 
strong prevalence (9). 
3.2.4 Corruption 
Higher levels of corruption may be correlated with higher levels of OID due to lower 
adherence to lending policies. For example, loan officers and loan committees tend 
to frequently grant exceptions in terms of loan requirements based not on sound 
credit decisions but on their own interest and advantage (Zurich). Nepotism can play 
a role in loan committees, particularly in small institutions like cooperatives (Exp11; 
Exp25; Exp29; Nar16).  
DRC is ranked 154th (out of 177) in the corruption perception index (Transparency 
International 2013). Corruption appears to influence economic interaction between 
officials on most levels. According to research by the Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poor (2013), 17.5 percent of borrowers in the DRC are willing to pay bribes to 
access credits and 20 percent of the borrowers regard corruption as a major obstacle 
for accessing financial services. A number of interviewees said that illicit payment for 
faster access to credit exists but is rare3 and FIs seem to master the risk of corruption 
of their loan officers through audits and supervision (WS3; Exp29). 
Comparing financial inclusion in different countries, corruption and nepotism have 
become a problem especially where demand for loans outweighs the supply. In 
Kinshasa, the demand for credits has not reached such a level. Looking at the current 
developments of the financial inclusion, this could change in the future. For now, 
corruption within FIs is attributed a low prevalence of 2.  
                                            
3  Our results for this delicate indicator may be biased due to selecting interviewees through loan 
officers and FIs through a major donor in the sector (KfW). 
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3.3 Industry-level indicators 
This level includes indicators that influence the whole of the financial sector targeting 
MSMEs, e.g. market penetration and development of PAR ratios. 
3.3.1 Market penetration 
“All FIs target the same central market and the same borrowers”  
(loan officer) 
Portfolio quality correlates directly with the degree of microfinance market penetration 
(Gonzales 2010). In a saturated market, in order to reach annual goals and receive 
positive evaluations from superiors there is more pressure on loan officers to serve 
“risky” borrowers or clients already served by other FIs. The evidence shows that 
almost all OID crises were preceded by microfinance sector penetration rates 
surpassing 10 percent (Zurich). To calculate market penetration, one divides the 
number of borrowers served by the number of potential borrowers among the poor 
population (i.e. the traditional target group of financial inclusion). High levels of 
penetration are assumed to cause a deterioration of lending practices and portfolio 
quality because FIs can no longer afford to handpick the most promising customers. 
Market penetration: 
Number of borrowers served 
Number of potential borrowers among poor population 
The level of market penetration is based on data from MIX and compared with annual 
reports of FIs. This creates three problems: a) the quotient overstates the number of 
current borrowers in markets where multiple borrowing exists; b) the MIX data for 
Congolese FIs is incomplete and gives no information on the activities of commercial 
banks targeting MSMEs; c) MIX data does not distinguish between regions, so there 
is no specific data for Kinshasa. It is thus not possible to clearly specify the number of 
borrowers based in the capital or other economic hubs and rural regions. This means 
that, in order to calculate the rate of market penetration in Kinshasa, we can only 
estimate numbers of potential borrowers and borrowers served using information 
provided by FIs which operate in the capital. 
Apart from the lack of MIX data there is a problem of measurement related to the 
definition of the denominator. While it is easy to determine the percentage of the 
population that is “economically active”, people between 15 and 65 (54 percent of the 
population), it is harder to calculate the overall number of potential borrowers. This 
value depends on the portion of poor among the population which is estimated at 
70 percent for the DRC (WDI 2013) but unknown for Kinshasa (as much of the 
economic power is concentrated in the capital, its poverty rate is probably lower than 
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the national average). Assuming equal poverty rates for the entire country, the 
calculation for Kinshasa is as follows: 
155,000 borrowers 
11 million * 0.54 (share of economically active)* 0.7 (share of poor) 
This results in a value of 3.7 percent which means that market penetration in Kinshasa is 
around 5 times higher compared to the country as a whole (0.71 percent). As the 
Zurich study shows, the denominator could be decreased by determining the 
segment of the population that is targeted by financial inclusion but has no need for 
microfinance (in other developing countries between 25 and 50 percent). If this value 
was 50 percent in Kinshasa, the level of market penetration would double to 7.4 
percent, over ten times the rate of the entire country. It is also conceivable that the 
number of borrowers (numerator) is higher than MIX indicates (unfortunately data 
from many FIs for verification is missing, especially that of commercial banks). Thus the 
resulting quotient for market penetration could be even higher. All these calculations 
remain approximations that can contribute to a debate rather than precisely describe 
the sector. 
Three of Kinshasa’s districts, Gombe, Kasavubu and Ngaliema, hold more than half of 
the capital’s financial service branches. In these districts, the level of market penetration 
is likely much higher than in the rest of the city. To better estimate the rate and thus 
the risk of OID will require more precise data. In the case of the 5 financial institutions 
examined for this study (excluding Mufesakin as it provides no MIX data) the number 
of borrowers has increased from 55,000 to 125,000 between 2009 and 2012 – leaving 
no doubt that the sector has reached a growth rate that will become hard to regulate. 
Interviews on the other hand showed that there are still entrepreneurs who are not 
willing to take out a loan under the current conditions, considered “disadvantageous 
and non-transparent” (FG4). This means that, even with significant increases in the 
number of borrowers and competition for borrowers in all income segments, there is 
still an untouched market that is waiting for FIs to render their products more attractive. 
To summarise, market penetration in the DRC and in Kinshasa prevails in certain 
areas where it plays an important role in the competition between lenders. Sector 
experts are divided over the issue of market penetration and the presented values 
that diverge so much from region to region (Exp2). Given the difficulties in measuring 
market penetration and the large regional differences in penetration ratios, we 
assessed the prevalence of market penetration as 5. 
3.3.2 Growth rate of total loan portfolios 
Much like market penetration, the growth rate of total loan portfolios gives an approxi-
mation of the scope of financial inclusion. The quality of a loan portfolio depends 
Assessment of the risk of over-indebtedness 23 
 
among others on its size and the number of borrowers. Strong portfolio growth can 
lead to a financial sector’s “overheating” (loans are granted quickly and without 
meticulous analysis; the default rate quickly increases). For the five institutions 
examined (and whose data is available on MIX) their added loan portfolio size 
doubled between 2009 and 2012 (Figure 7). 
Figure 7:  Growth of loan portfolios for 5 FIs 
 
Source: MIX 
 
Total loan portfolio growth is concentrated in Kinshasa and the Kivus, which are 
responsible for 80 percent of the total loan portfolio of 190 million dollars (BCC 2012). 
Even in comparison to other countries, Kinshasa boasts a high loan portfolio growth 
rate which may, in the future, contribute to the risk of OID, especially if regulation 
remains low (prevalence: 7). 
3.3.3 Development of PAR ratios 
According to the Zurich study, loan portfolio growth is not correlated with PAR ratios. 
In countries that have witnessed OID crises, the PAR ratio spiked just before markets 
overheated. One could argue that the PAR development is not an indicator for OID 
risk but instead a symptom of OID pre-determined by other early-warning signs. 
However, we have included PAR ratios since PAR development is monitored by FIs 
and the central bank and is, in contrast to other indicators, quantifiable. For most FIs, 
the PAR30 increased significantly in the past years. Judging by official numbers, it 
seems that this increase is less serious for internationally operating FIs that have the 
capacities and mechanisms to master the risk (chapter 5.3). In the DRC the PAR30 is 
particularly high for cooperatives, many of which have PAR levels of over 20 percent, 
sometimes even 40 percent – despite instructions of the central bank that the PAR30 
must not surpass 5 percent (Exp11; Exp25; BCC 2012). The following figure shows 
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that the majority of institutions examined in this study are incapable of adhering to 
this regulation. 
Figure 8: Development of the PAR30 in % for 5 FIs based in Kinshasa 
 
Source: MIX 
 
There is not enough data (annual and overall) to give a wider view of PAR develop-
ments, but the large majority of experts consider the recent PAR development a 
serious problem for Kinshasa’s financial sector. Some estimate that the PAR30 has 
reached an average of 15 percent across FIs (Exp11; Exp25). The fact that in 2012 
the BCC had to shut down 12 FIs due to their PAR levels confirms such estimations. 
During interviews we noticed large differences in the assessment of PAR levels. To 
some FIs, a PAR of over 10 percent is no cause for concern even though that is twice 
the 5 percent limit recommended by the BCC (prevalence of 7). 
3.3.4 Quality and use of credit information system 
Asked what must be done to lower the risk of OID, almost all experts and FI 
employees called for an improving of the DRC’s official credit information system 
(“Centrale de Risque” or CdR). On the supply side, such a system is essential 
because it gives information on potential borrowers. For the demand side, an 
information system is important because it can have disciplinary effects on borrowers 
when they know that their credit history is monitored and stored in the system. For 
the system to work, the minimum credit balance registered must be low enough to 
include all borrowers, information must remain in the system for a sufficient period of 
time, and borrowers must be aware of its functionality.  
The CdR has existed for some time but is hardly used as it contains very little 
information on very few borrowers; the index of “bad borrowers” comprises only 500 
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names (Exp6) and there is currently no functioning system to prevent multiple 
borrowing in Kinshasa and the DRC as a whole. 
After 12 years of unsuccessful donor attempts to improve the DRC’s credit infor-
mation system, KfW started working on the modernization of the CdR on behalf of the 
BCC and the private sector 4 years ago. The new system is designed to include 
online information on borrowers provided by each FI (Exp6, Exp31, and Exp32). A 
central question in the modernization process of the system is the legal form of its 
management and supervision. As Congolese law does not allow completely 
outsourcing the directorate-general, a hybrid model of management has been 
developed: the role of directorate-general (SOCERCI SA) is assumed by a private 
service provider while the board of directors is established by the BCC (Exp6). This 
model was agreed on by the steering committee which is composed of the private 
sector and the BCC. The next step lies in recruiting for the management level through 
international tender and involvement of shareholders in the course of 2014.  
Also lacking at present is a unique identification system for individuals or borrowers 
(e.g. through fingerprints or iris). Such a system is considered essential for the 
functioning of the reformed credit information system. Outside the BCC, collecting 
data on borrowers is prohibited. Some FIs have become sceptical due to the delay in 
the CdR reform and have begun to exchange information on borrowers informally 
(Exp3; Exp26). From the FIs’ point of view, this breach of banking secrecy is 
necessary in order to assure the quality of their loan portfolio. But this informal 
information exchange remains incomplete because of the large number of FIs and 
the lack of supervisory capacities. 
Despite the strong demand for a CdR there are critical voices against a centralisation 
of data and the power it would give to the central administrator. Other critics, 
especially among cooperatives, fear that the system will be too expensive for small 
service providers and that only banks and large FIs will be able to afford the access 
(Exp5). This concern could be addressed by charging different membership fees 
depending on the size of the FI (WS4). Despite the doubts, a credit information 
system is indispensable to avoid OID so its complete plays a large role for the OID 
risk (prevalence of 10). 
3.3.5 Perceived commercial bank involvement & level and trends 
in competition 
“There are too many providers in the same locations, we share the same clientele, 
and there is too much supply, too many FIs with the same services. Even the banks 
are fighting for the same borrowers” (agency director with a cooperative) 
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Recently, “downscaling”, targeting SMEs instead of large enterprises, on the part of 
commercial banks has increased in the sector of financial inclusion. Competition 
between MFIs, cooperatives, and microfinance banks is intensified by the arrival of 
commercial banks. On the one hand, competition leads to better credit conditions and 
higher productivity of FIs. On the other, the pressure created by increasing 
competition can cause excessive expansion of lending, negligent borrower analyses, 
a hunt for borrowers that are already served by other FIs and risky lending by 
commercial banks emboldened by large capital resources. 
In Kinshasa competition has increased according to 85 percent of interviewed loan 
officers but it is especially strong between FIs who target the same market segment. 
Cooperatives and MFIs share almost no potential clientele with commercial banks. 
They target the same microbusinesses with credits under 5,000 dollars, or more 
often, below 1,000 dollars. Commercial banks avoid handing out credits below 
10,000 dollars. However, financial inclusion banks (Advans and ProCredit in our 
sample) have also recently started targeting the segment above 10,000 dollars 
(Figure 9). 
Figure 9:  Loan portfolio of a bank in financial inclusion 
 
Source: BCC 2012 
 
While Advans continues to offer smaller loans, ProCredit intends to no longer grant 
loans under 10,000 dollars (Exp2; Exp26; FG4). This shift in target groups is justified 
by the relatively high running costs for inferior credit sizes and their obligation by 
shareholders to seek economic sustainability. Profitability, they argue, can only come 
with higher loans (Exp2; Exp29). Financial inclusion banks are thus gradually 
abandoning the micro-segment to serve more profitable borrowers. 
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Commercial banks are equally targeting the SME segment since the number of large 
enterprises (and clients) in the DRC is small. In this fight for borrowers, commercial 
banks profit from large equity capital that allows them to aggressively penetrate the 
SME market. Apart from this hunt for borrowers there is also a hunt for loan officers. 
As banks pay better, cooperatives and MFIs lose employees whose training has cost 
them time and resources (Exp1; Exp29).  
The following figure gives an overview of some of the most important FIs in Kinshasa, 
all of which were examined in the context of this study. The figure shows which FIs 
are targeting which income segment. 
Figure 10:  Competition between FIs in different loan segments  
 
Source: Interviews 
 
Similar to market penetration, the high level of competition is confined to certain 
market segments and districts. Due to particularly high levels of competition in the 
capital, we have attributed a prevalence of 7 for competition. Regarding the country 
as a whole, the degree of competition appears to be much less alarming. 
“Competition is intense: microfinance banks and MFIs are manageable but 
commercial banks can offer way better interest rates, and more diverse products. 
They are on another level regarding marketing and PR, higher outstanding loans and 
other means of writing off losses.”  
(BM1) 
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The impact of competition on the OID risk is dealt with in more detail in the section on 
firm-level indicators (prevalence of commercial bank involvement: 6; prevalence of 
competition: 7). 
3.3.6 Perceived investment flows and FI liquidity 
Loan portfolio growth and increase of investment lead to an increase of FI liquidity. 
The overly liquid FIs can be tempted to push for fast growth by reinvesting the money 
directly, particularly in existing markets. This local growth of loan portfolios can lead 
to more and more credits to groups already served, to lax analyses and finally to OID 
(Zurich). 
With the exception of commercial banks it seems that FIs in Kinshasa rather suffer 
from lack of capital rather than over-liquidity. That fact that microcredits do not always 
go hand in hand with micro-savings (which are less lucrative in the short term) is one 
reason for this. Apart from liquidity, the ability to grant loans is also negatively 
affected by this imbalance between microcredits and savings. The fact that the 
requested loan balances are rarely granted confirms this notion (Exp11). 
Figure 11:  Index of Economic Freedom 
 
Source: Heritage 2014 
 
Overall, there is little foreign direct investment in the DRC. About 3 billion dollars are 
invested per year, the same amount as Congo-Brazzaville, a country with a 
population size of 6 percent of the DRC’s (CIA 2013). As is shown in Figure 11, the 
DRC is not considered a good place to invest. The majority of existing investments 
target natural resources and not the financial sector.  
Given low liquidity of FIs in Kinshasa and only little foreign direct investment in the 
DRC as a whole, neither indicator significantly contributes to OID risk (prevalence of 
investment flows: 4; FI liquidity: 5). 
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3.4 Firm-level indicators 
Firm-level indicators deal with individual practices of FIs. The majority of data is 
derived from MIX, combined with information gathered through interviews. Variables 
include organizational characteristics of FIs as well as their approaches and targets 
that influence the OID risk for MSME borrowers in Kinshasa. 
3.4.1 Average loan balance per borrower 
The relationship between average loan balance and OID is not clear. According to 
the Zurich approach, the granting of small loans indicates that borrowers have only 
low incomes and FIs are aware of potential repayment problems. For higher loans 
there is a higher risk that a household’s cash-flow will be overstrained by instalments. 
Average loan balances per borrower saw a sharp increase in countries that 
experienced OID crises. The Zurich study, however, does not view this growth rate 
as too influential. Available data for Kinshasa is sparse: 
Figure 12:  Development of average loan balances per borrower 
 
Source: MIX 
 
Figure 12 shows the development of average loan balances per borrower of different 
FIs that in the past shared the same target group. The remarkable increase for 
ProCredit is a result of their changing portfolio (3.3.5). The average loan balance for 
FIs targeting MSMEs lies between 2,000 and 10,000 dollars, which appears to be the 
segment of higher OID risk (WS4 ; prevalence: 5). 
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3.4.2 Loan requirements and lending methodologies 
“Borrowers need more support, they ask the same question each credit cycle.” 
“Support for each borrower takes time. Given the number of borrowers  
it is not possible. A good analysis will always take time.”  
(Loan officers) 
Loan requirements and lending methodologies are essential for a borrower’s ability to 
repay. It is thus necessary to revise their alignment with needs and capacities of 
borrowers and the behaviour of FI employees towards borrowers. 
Loan requirements 
In the case of MSMEs, the granting of a credit depends on a cash-flow analysis, the 
guarantors, an analysis of the borrower’s conduct (reputation, etc.) as well as his/her 
credit history. Analyses are performed according to each FI’s guidelines. The depth 
of these varies between FIs. Depending on the loan balance, analyses can have 
multiple phases and several actors implicated. For verification, loan officers hand 
over the borrower profiles to a superior or a credit committee. 
FIs in financial inclusion who are part of this research ask proof of a borrower’s salary 
only in the case of consumer loans where the monthly instalments shall not surpass a 
third of the monthly salary (Chapter 3.4.2). 
Repayment conditions 
When a borrower faces difficulties repaying a loan, his/her FI is rarely ready to 
change the frequency or modalities of repayment. In most cases there are late fees 
or other penalties that accumulate each day. Some FIs offer a rescheduling of debt or 
restructuring to borrowers in need (LO11). 
Borrower support 
“We (loan officers) have a tough job and are exposed to all kinds of difficulties:  
we go out on a limb for borrowers - and the next day they tell us the exact stories  
we warned them about. They need capital and pretend to listen to you;  
but once they have the money they no longer pick up the phone.”  
(Nar1) 
On average, loan officers interviewed for the study paid their customers two visits 
before granting a credit to verify the collateral and the borrower’s overall situation. 
The length of these visits varies a lot between loan officers. However, the frequency 
of visits diminishes after the granting of a credit across FIs and loan officers. Often 
these visits are limited to verifying the borrower’s business and to reminding him/her 
of a due date (see borrower interviews & loan officer interviews). At the same time, 
loan officers and borrowers imply that borrowers are bothered by the repeated visits 
from FI employees. 
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Development of loan balances 
Borrowers with a good credit history are often prompted by loan officers to take out 
another credit with a higher balance. Borrowers with repayment problems were on 
average in the 3rd or 4th credit cycle so they were already familiar with the field of 
microfinance. Achieving a higher credit balance is easier for experienced borrowers: 
while for new borrowers the balance is often limited by monthly instalments that must 
not exceed 40-50 percent of their residual income, FIs grant more generous 
thresholds to more experienced borrowers. (Nar4). 
Incentives for loan officers 
“Individual targets and debt collection, borrower support and customer acquisition  
are in conflict – one cannot fulfil all at the same time.”  
(Loan officer) 
Loan officers are assessed in terms of individual annual targets. These targets aim to 
increase officers’ performance which is measured by size of loan portfolio, the 
number of borrowers, and the PAR ratio. Targets place an emphasis on growth while 
widely ignoring other factors. Some FIs give performance bonuses. 
Awareness-raising for OID 
Loan officers are offered trainings and fora to share their experiences with their 
institution (BM1-8). For the most part, financial inclusion banks offer more extensive 
trainings including loan officer questionnaires. FIs raise awareness among their staff 
for credit default and its consequences for the assessment of the officer’s 
performance. Interviews with loan officers have shown that the awareness-raising 
trainings by FIs do not actually help understand the borrowers’ point of view nor the 
sacrifices borrowers have to make in order to repay their loans (prevalence of 5). 
3.4.3 Productivity (borrowers per staff member) 
“We are constantly running after the borrowers. We are overburdened with  
borrower acquisition, training, consulting, administration, disbursement,  
and monitoring outstanding loans.” 
How many loan officers do you know who have worked in this position for  
more than 2 years? It is too demanding.”  
(Loan officer; FG1) 
As mentioned in these introducing statements, loan officers are subjected to high 
pressure, which affects their ability to support borrowers. A variable to measure loan 
officer productivity is the number of borrowers per staff member or loan officer. While 
MIX data shows no significant changes to loan officer productivity over time, 
interviews with loan officers indicate that the number of borrowers per officer has 
increased. For some FIs the number has actually decreased but the average loan 
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balance per borrower in loan officers’ portfolios has increased. In general it seems 
that loan officers feel an increasing pressure to perform (loan officer interviews). 
Figure 13:  Development of number of borrowers per loan officer 
 
Source: Interviews with loan officers (n=30) 
 
Productivity of staff 
While the number of borrowers per loan officer (Figure 13) gives us only one side of 
customer support quality, the number of borrowers per FI staff member (overall) 
completes the picture by showing the workload of all staff (including administrative, 
supervisory etc.). MIX data is incomplete in this area (Figure 14). There are large 
differences in borrower numbers per officer between FIs which mostly lie in their 
respective focus on individual credits or credit groups. All FIs interviewed supervise 
their loan officers, especially for higher loan balances. This includes visits to the 
borrower by supervisors or agency directors. The overall increase of borrower per 
staff member makes the task of monitoring and supervision more difficult. In light of 
the above-mention points, we view this indicator as very alarming for Kinshasa’s OID 
risk (prevalence: 9). 
61%
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9%
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Figure 14:  Development of the number of borrowers per staff member 
 
Source: MIX  
 
3.4.4 Range of loan products 
The range of loan products is an indicator used by Rotter (2012). Her study shows 
that if borrower’s loyalty to an FI depends to a large degree on the renewal of their 
credits, it is likely that a borrower’s credit balance is raised even when this is not 
advisable. If an institution’s range of loan products with which to acquire and retain 
borrowers is wide, this risk decreases because the FI can tailor the product to a 
customer’s needs. 
The majority of interviewees mentioned that they hope to acquire higher credit 
balances by remaining with the same FI for a period of time. Some FIs have ceased 
the automatic increasing of loan balances each cycle and instead perform a new 
analysis for each cycle (Exp2). However, the ease of granting a consecutive credit 
(instead of acquiring new borrowers) may tempt loan officers to offer new loans to 
existing borrowers who at that point do not require one (Exp30). 
While savings accounts are offered by all FIs examined, a monopoly held by the 
“Société Nationale d’Assurances (SONAS)” prohibits FIs from offering any kind of 
insurances. Because entrepreneurs have little or no confidence in SONAS (Exp24), 
they prefer to remain uninsured, which increases their vulnerability for OID and 
external shocks. Kinshasa’s FIs have been criticized for their lack of product diversity 
and insufficient adapting to borrowers’ needs (Exp4; Exp24; FG4). As a whole, FIs 
rather target existing businesses with similar features. A lack of guarantee funds (a 
measure supported by AFD) means that no risk products, e.g. agricultural credits or 
start-up financing, are offered (Exp29; Engel et al. 2012). Some experts have 
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signalled that simply importing financial service products from elsewhere and 
imposing them on the Congolese market has contributed to the credit default rate 
(Exp11). Defaulting borrowers say that the root of their problems lies in a lack of 
flexibility concerning monthly instalments and the lack of a grace period. The 
absence of a grace period particularly affects long-term investments like product 
import which requires time for product purchase, transport, customs, and sale (Nar2; 
Nar12). Weak diversifying of financial service products and the fact that certain 
products do not correspond to MSME’s needs increases the risk of OID. As the range 
of loan products is indeed very limited in Kinshasa, we have accorded a prevalence 
of 9. 
3.4.5 Growth and market targets 
In financial inclusion, growth targets and selection of markets are important to 
examine because high growth objectives and targeting of already saturated markets 
can induce FIs, in the fight for customers, to relax loan requirements and lending 
methodologies (Zurich). FIs in financial inclusion in Kinshasa, however, have different 
approaches. As described above (chapter 3.3.5), certain FIs try to increase their 
growth by aiming at higher loan segments than traditional microfinance institutions 
(BM1; BM2; BM5). Others pursue growth through expanding their number of branches. 
Some commercial banks have only just entered the market serving MSMEs (Exp8; 
Exp9). 
Some market segments and target groups are shared by different FIs that compete 
with each other. Competition is especially high for already served entrepreneurs with 
promising business development. A common method get more customers is to sign 
new borrowers by rebuying their loan with another provider. 
“It’s normal to steal borrowers from other banks.”  
(Loan officer) 
“Every day the same borrowers already served are recruited elsewhere.  
This undermines their will to repay and their morality”  
(loan officer) 
“Loan officers come and talk to me all the time (…) they outcompete each other, 
offering me better conditions all the time”  
(Nar16) 
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The fight for customers is particularly strong in the central markets and trading points 
of Kinshasa, Gombe being the most important. FIs’ focus on growth and the 
competition for established and limited markets encourages OID. This early-warning 
indicator has thus been accorded the prevalence of 7. 
3.4.6 Multiple lending/borrowing 
Multiple lending and borrowing are not a problem per se but serve as proxy for other 
challenges in the sector of financial inclusion. In the countries that experienced OID 
crises, multiple lending was widespread. The general prevalence of cross-borrowing 
in the DRC is unknown. All FIs examined generally accept to take on borrowers that 
have already signed with a competitor. Some FIs even allow the granting of several 
loans to one and the same household to increase liquidity in the short term, e.g. to 
retrieve merchandise/goods from customs (BM1). In the case of cross-borrowing, the 
outstanding instalments with a second FI are accounted for in the calculation of 
monthly expenditures, but only when this information is available. Financial services 
can be tailored to borrowers’ needs but only when borrowers decide to disclose all 
information, i.e. outstanding loans with other FIs. 
In the absence of means to monitor borrowers’ levels of debt and since certain 
market segments are highly competitive, taking out multiple loans is possible and 
considered by some one of the principal drivers of OID in the country. Repayment 
problems as well as social and economic pressure can drive borrowers into a vicious 
cycle of taking out more and more loans, leading in the worst case to OID. Lack of 
information on borrowers’ financial history (see section on credit information system) 
exacerbates the problems related to multiple lending. Given these circumstances, 
multiple lending is given a prevalence value of 6. 
3.4.7 Consumer credits 
In financial sectors that experienced OID crises, consumer credits to microfinance 
customers contributed to OID. As financial inclusion in the DRC is a fairly recent 
phenomenon, consumer credits to MSMEs have not been playing an important role in 
the sector (BCC 2010; BCC 2012; Figure 15). Consumer credits are above all 
granted to borrowers with a steady salary. For consumer credits, due instalments 
must not surpass a third of the monthly salary (Exp11). As mentioned above, lenders 
have little or no access to information on borrower’s (consumer) credit history. A 
problem faced by cooperatives is that government salaries can often only be 
transferred to banks and MFIs so that cooperatives have a hard time gaining those 
who receive salaries as customers (BM5). 
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Employees can have trouble repaying a loan because public officials are often not 
paid on time. In general, consumer credits can contribute to the risk of a debt spiral 
(Exp7; Exp25) but they are hardly granted in the DRC which is why we attributed a 
low prevalence of 3.  
Figure 15:  Types of loans granted in percent 
 
Source: BCC 2012 
 
3.5 Summarising the early-warning index: 
the risk of OID in Kinshasa 
OID risk in Kinshasa 
In this paper, risk of OID was assessed by the prevalence of the above-mentioned 19 
early-warning indicators for OID (chapters 3.1 to 3.4) To ensure traceability and 
comparability of our results, we applied a similar approach as the Zurich study by 
attributing values from 1 to 10 (low to high) for the prevalence of each indicator 
(column 2). The following table includes the final value for OID risk in Kinshasa as 
well as a summary of every indicator’s prevalence number. With uniform weighting 
(1/19 for each indicator), the overall risk of OID in Kinshasa is 6.04 (column 3). When 
we attribute a double-weighting to those 5 indicators assumed more influential for 
OID (dark green in the table), the resulting value for OID risk is only slightly higher at 
6.27 (column 5). To make our results comparable to those of the Zurich study, we 
also calculated OID risk using only the 14 indicators applied by that study (column 6). 
The resulting value of 6.12 does not significantly differ from our own results with and 
without weighting. 
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Table 3: Structure and results of OID Index 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Early-warning indicator Prevalence Result  
with 
uniform 
weights 
Coefficient 
using 
stronger 
weights 
Result  
with 
stronger 
weights 
Result  
if using 
Zurich 
indicators 
GDP per capita growth 6 0.318 0.042 0.252 - 
Remittances 2 0.106 0.042 0.084 0.12 
Political & Economic stability 9 0.477 0.042 0.378 - 
Corruption 2 0.106 0.042 0.084 - 
Market penetration 5 0.265 0.042 0.21 0.3 
Growth rate of total loan 
portfolios 
7 0.371 0.042 0.294 0.42 
Development of PAR ratios 7 0.371 0.084 0.574 - 
Quality and use of credit 
information system 
10 0.53 0.084 0.82 1.2 
Commercial bank involvement 6 0.318 0.042 0.252 0.36 
Levels of competition 7 0.371 0.042 0.294 0.42 
Investment flows 4 0.212 0.042 0.168 0.24 
FI Liquidity 5 0.265 0.042 0.21 0.3 
Average loan balance per 
borrower 
5 0.265 0.042 0.21 0.3 
Loan requirements and lending 
methodologies 
5 0.265 0.084 0.41 0.6 
Productivity 9 0.477 0.084 0.738 0.54 
Range of loan products 9 0.477 0.042 0.378 - 
Growth and market targets 7 0.371 0.042 0.294 0.42 
Multiple lending/borrowing 6 0.318 0.084 0.492 0.72 
Consumer credits 3 0.159 0.042 0.126 0.18 
End result  6.04 ~1 6.27 6.12 
 
All modes of calculation result in a value for OID risk in Kinshasa between 6.04 and 
6.27. With these values, Kinshasa exceeds the threshold of 6.0 and thus falls within the 
category of having a “relatively high level of early-warning signals for OID” (Table 4). 
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Table 4:  Early-warning indicators of OID 
OID early-warning sign index value Meaning 
< 3.5 Lowest level of early-warning signals for OID 
3.5 – 5 Relatively low level of early-warning signals for OID 
5 – 5.5 Medium level of early-warning signals for OID 
5.5 – 6 
Medium to high level of earlywarning signals for OID 
6 – 7.5 Relatively high level of early-warning signals for OID 
> 7.5 Highest level of early-warning signals for OID 
Source: Zurich 
 
According to this index, Kinshasa, which boasts the largest financial inclusion sector 
in the DRC, is in the same risk group as Peru, Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
were in the Zurich study. These countries are marked by a vibrant microfinance 
sector with high degrees of competition and a lack of supervisory bodies or credit 
information centres. Bosnia was in an OID crisis at the time of the Zurich study 
(2010). The most important variables for the high-risk assessment in the case of 
Kinshasa are: 
• The lack of a credit information system; 
• Pressure on loan officers to increase productivity which is a result of strong 
competition and leads to lax lending methodologies; 
• Loan conditions and range of products that grant little leeway to borrowers and 
are not suited for the DRC’s politically fragile and economically precarious 
context. In particular, financial literacy of borrowers is not sufficiently addressed. 
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As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the index for OID risk merely serves as 
an alarm signal and does not necessarily mean that Kinshasa will be hit by an OID 
crisis. However, the index helps to find actions and plans to reduce the risk of OID. It 
can also contribute to a sound development of the sector of financial inclusion which 
is beneficial to borrowers and FIs. 
Mission drift? 
Some stakeholders suspect a certain “mission drift” on the part of FIs as they 
increasingly cater to customers who are better off than their original clientele – a 
notion not easily proven through empirical research (Armendáriz & Szafarz 2009; 
Mersland & Strom 2010). Yet the previous chapter has shown signs of mission drift 
on the part of some FIs operating in Kinshasa. FIs focus too strongly on marketing 
and ignore the risks of fast growth and borrowers’ needs. This way financial inclusion 
operations may actually become detrimental to economic development and 
empowerment. A number of indicators can be used to estimate the degree of the 
financial inclusion sector’s social mission.  
A first indicator is the number of borrowers. Figure 16 shows a strong increase in 
individuals borrowing from Congolese FIs between 2006 and 2009 followed again by 
decreasing numbers until 2012.. FIs examined in this study, whose main activities 
take place in Kinshasa, have had a different development between 2010 and 2012. 
Advans increased the number of active borrowers from 1,800 to 4,400, Finca from 
61,000 to 84,000 and Opportunity from 4,400 to 6,000. Only the numbers of Mecreco 
have stayed the same (at 24,000) while those of ProCredit decreased from 7,700 to 
5,600 (MIX). 
Figure 16: Number of borrowers per FI (median) 
 
Source: MIX 
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The goal of financial inclusion is to enable access to finance to the large segment of 
the population which is currently excluded from financial services. In the previous 
chapter on OID risk indicators, this goal was examined through an analysis of market 
saturation. However, a strong increase in the number of borrowers per year (more 
than 63 percent) as occurred in the DRC between 2006 and 2009, can also lead to a 
deteriorating portfolio quality (Gonzales 2010; see chapter 3.3.1). 
A second indicator is the percentage of women among borrowers. In the DRC’s 
microfinance segment, women contribute more of their revenue to the well-being of 
the household and tend to be granted smaller loan balances than men (Engel et al. 
2013). Figure 17 shows the gender distribution is changing in favour of female 
borrowers. 
Figure 17:  Percentage of female borrowers 
 
Source: MIX 
 
Social performance of the financial sector can also be assessed in terms of poverty 
rates among borrowers. Ideally one should examine the number of borrowers per 
income segment (KfW 2011). As such data is often inaccessible, Armendàriz & 
Morduch (2010) suggest using the loan balance per borrower instead of income as 
an indicator. According to MIX, the average loan balance per borrower in the DRC 
was 751 dollars in 2012 compared to 400 dollars GDP per capita. For the FIs 
examined for this study, this ratio is even more divergent: for ProCredit it is 4,267 
percent, Advans 1,222 percent, and even Mecreco and Finca 373 percent and 113 
percent, respectively. Only Opportunity has an average loan balance lower than the 
GDP per person with a ratio of 72 percent (MIX). This may indicate that FIs are 
serving borrowers who are better off than the average person but the level of loan 
balances also raises questions on their mission in terms of poverty reduction. 
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Despite the competition between FIs and its effects on the OID risk, 95 percent of the 
population remains unbanked (BCC 2012). The current moderate growth level of the 
financial sector means a good time to push for the establishment of a supervisory 
body (KfW 2011). Data upon which to assess the level of growth was not accessible 
at the time of research but growth in terms of borrower numbers, loan portfolios and 
the average loan balance to GDP per capita ratio are contrasted by a lag in regulatory 
measures. 
If the granting of higher loan balances is used to subsidize loans to poorer income 
segments, targeting higher segments can go hand in hand with a double bottom line. 
Some FIs in Kinshasa traditionally dedicated to microfinance are increasingly turning 
way from microloans, even eliminating them from their portfolio. 
As described above, commercial banks (that needn’t necessarily consider social 
targets) have started penetrating the loan segment targeting MSMEs in Kinshasa and 
the Kivus. They have intensified the competition in this specific and limited segment 
without bringing to the table competencies for more support for this vulnerable 
income segment (Exp2). Competition between FIs for central markets, combined with 
a lack of supervisory bodies, increases the pressure on FI personnel. Loan 
requirements are thus often not adapted to borrowers’ needs and vulnerability. 
In summary, one can say that FIs in Kinshasa have conflicting goals. As was shown, 
their social targets and objectives of financial/economic sustainability can contradict 
each other. By placing the emphasis on financial sustainability over social targets, the 
risk of poor portfolio quality increases. However, if one examines the different 
objectives of financial inclusion, it is clear that social and financial goals also have the 
potential to complement each other: 
• FIs with solid financing, aiming for profitability can add to the professionali-
zation of the sector of financial inclusion and to an increasing scope of 
borrower categories; 
• Subsidies and not-for-profit programmes can be brought together to serve 
borrowers of poorer segments (KfW 2011). 
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4 Degree of over-indebtedness in the sample 
The previous chapter indicated 
a relatively high level of early-
warning signals for OID based 
on macroeconomic data and 
interviews. It brought together 
verifiable data and subjective 
perceptions. In the current 
chapter we examine the se-
verity of OID among borrowers 
who have defaulted on a 
payment. This is based on 
their own perception as well 
as the duration and severity 
of repayment problems. This 
“OID index” allows us to 
determine typical reasons for 
OID as well as its implications 
for the individual borrower. 
A total of 101 borrowers (51 
men, 50 women) were inter-
viewed in Kinshasa. The 
primary selection criterion 
was that they were in default 
of payment at the time of 
research or shortly before.  
Borrowers were approached via their financial 
service provider, i.e. microfinance banks, MFIs 
and cooperatives. Despite efforts to include the 
same amount of micro, small, and medium 
businesses of all sectors, it was easier for FIs to 
provide us with micro and small businesses in 
the area of petty trade (see box).  
Factsheet sample of borrowers 
Men: 51; Women: 50 
Type of 
institution # %
Loan 
balance  
ø (USD) 
Loan 
cycle 
ø
Banks 39 38.6% 9,300 3.6
Cooperatives 25 24.8% 2,400 4.0
MFIs 37 36.6% 950 2.7
Total 101 4,500 3.5
 
Sector (multiple answers possible) #
Petty trade 75
Service 21
Production/processing 5
Trade 5
 
Number of employees 
None 59 
1-5 Employees 36 
5-10 employees 3 
> 10 employees 3 
 
Loan 
balance 
(USD) 
<1,000 1,000 -
5,000
5,001-
10,000 
>10,000 n/a
Banks 3 17 12 5 2
Cooperatives 7 13 1 1 3
MFIs 27 8 2 
Total 37 38 15 6 5
Type of loan 
Individual 67
Group 34
 
Objective of loan 
Purchase goods/merchandise 73
Other investment (engine-
generator, construction, travel) 10
N/A 18
 
Other outstanding loans 
No 80
Yes 21
Average loan balance of those who 
have a second outstanding loan:  
8,500 dollars 
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4.1 Over-indebtedness index 
As described in chapter 2.2.1 the qualitative definition for OID by Schicks (2010) can 
help understand the OID situation in Kinshasa: 
“A microfinance customer is over-indebted if he/she is continuously 
struggling to meet repayment deadlines and repeatedly has to make 
unduly sacrifices to meet his/her loan obligations  
(Schicks 2010 : 7)” 
Accordingly, borrowers are considered over-indebted if they: 
• Have continuing problems to repay; 
• Employ coping strategies that demand existential sacrifices to meet due dates; 
• Consider themselves over-indebted. 
The advantage of this definition is that it allows those affected to speak for 
themselves and it is complementary to the more abstract approaches used in the 
previous chapter. In order to account for the subjectivity of perceptions and the 
impossibility of verifying quantity and quality of sacrifices, multiple qualitative 
indicators are combined, resulting in an OID index. This approach avoids cash-flow 
analyses (requiring information that MSMEs in Kinshasa often do not have). 
The index results from multiplying various compounding factors (see next chapter). 
The borrower’s perception and the duration of repayment problems on the one hand; 
sacrifices and health and social problems due to being in default of payment on the 
other. The index is calculated through the formula: (length + perception) * (sacrifices 
+ problems). 
4.1.1 Perception and duration of problems 
FIs facilitated interviews with borrowers in default of loan repayment – most of which 
were listed in the PAR. 69 percent of borrowers were listed in the PAR30 so their 
default in payment had lasted at least 30 days (Figure 18). 
It seems that bank clients in the sample had more severe problems with repayment 
than other borrowers: 54 percent of them have been in default for more than 90 days 
(PAR90) compared to 32 percent of borrowers with MFIs and cooperatives  
(Figure 19). 
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Figure 18:  Duration of repayment problems in the sample 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
 
Figure 19:  Duration of problems by type of provider 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
 
To quantify the duration of repayment problems we have attributed values from 0 to 
5. Generally it is assumed that the longer the delay in payment, the more difficult it is 
to resolve the problems. No delay in repayment counts as 0 while late payment for 
more than a year counts 5. The moderate factor 2 is attributed for persons who 
cannot remember how long they have been in default of payment. 
Components Description Manifestations 
Duration of delay/ 
problems  in payment 
0; <30 days; 30-89 days; 90 - 179 days; 
180 - 365 days; > 365 days 0;1;2;3;4;5 
15%
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9%
10% resolved
>30 days
30-89 days
90-179 days
180-365 days
>365 days
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73 percent of the sample consider themselves over-indebted. Borrowers of banks 
consider themselves more indebted than average (85 percent), while 38 percent of 
MFI borrowers are confident that they will be able to repay and continue their 
business (Figure 31 : appendix). Borrowers who consider themselves over-indebted 
are incapable of meeting due dates, paying interest, and late fees. Other signs of 
OID are stress and mental consequences endured by the borrower. 
“My business is no longer working, I can no longer repay” 
“I am uneasy when I think about the late fees accumulating” 
“After the rescheduling of debt, the interest rate multiplied” 
“I am unable to pay, I can no longer take the pressure from the loan officers” 
“I cannot sleep, I am traumatized, I have no appetite” 
“I am choking on the debt, I am in a crisis”  
(Borrowers) 
27 percent of the sample who do not feel over-indebted despite delays in payment 
explain that their business is running and creating profits, even if these are lower than 
expected. They are confident that they will overcome repayment problems. It is 
striking that many of them mentioned their savings accounts which in many cases 
seemed to smoothen income flows. For the index, the values 0 (No, I am not over-
indebted) and 1 (I am indeed over-indebted) were attributed. 
Components Description Manifestations 
Perception of OID No; Yes 0; 1 
 
4.1.2 Coping strategies for OID and repayment 
In this section we analyse coping strategies used and sacrifices made by borrowers 
in order to repay loans. 
Strategies are sorted into categories by type of sacrifice (cutting down expenditures, 
business, borrowing, family, assets: Figure 20) which receive values according to 
severity of the sacrifice (1 to 6). As an example, more than 70 percent of respondents 
said that they must work more in order to meet due dates. This is not necessarily a 
sacrifice and by no means existential so the value 1 is attributed. However, the 
30 percent who save money by eating less make an existential sacrifice – which 
receives the value 6 (Table 5). 
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Figure 20: Repayment strategies by type of FI 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
 
Table 5: Overview of the index of sacrifices/coping strategies 
Sacrifices  
(value) Business Debt 
External 
payment Assets  
Eat less 6 
Let  
employees 
go 4
Additional 
loans (friends, 
family) 4
Financial 
support 
from family 2 
Work  
more  
hours 1
Take children 
out of school 6 Stop hiring  2
Loan from 
other FI 5
Debt 
collection 1 Savings 1
Move houses  5 
Cut down 
salaries 3             
Sell 
household 
goods 4 
Sell goods 
below price 3             
Forego 
purchases 3                 
TOTAL 24   12   9   3   2
 
For each interviewed borrower, the applicable values are added together in order to 
categorise the borrower’s total severity of sacrifices in five levels: none, moderate, 
tangible, severe, and fatal. 55 percent of the sample make sacrifices that can be 
considered tangible, severe, or fatal. They face more existential sacrifices such as 
reducing the amount of food or expenditure on school fees, harmful business 
decisions (closing of shops, letting employees go, etc.) or requesting another loan 
with other FIs or informal lenders which, in the long run, can exacerbate borrowers’ 
capacity to continue their business (Table 6). 
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Table 6: “Sacrifice” index for sample 
Index Severity of sacrifice Examples 
Percentage 
of sample 
0 Non   1 
1–5 Moderate Moving houses or letting go employees 44 
6–10 Tangible Eating less or taking out second loan & selling products below price  28 
11–15 Severe Taking children out of school & letting employees  go & seeking support from family members  17 
>15 Fatal  Eating less & taking children out of school & not paying employees & support from family members 11 
 
In a second step, we assess other problems which borrowers encountered as a 
consequence of coping strategies or debt collection practices. These can be 
classified into health, relational and psychological problems, as well as declines in 
business. More than 21 percent of the sample have had problems related to health or 
well-being in connection with delay in payment or with debt collection practices. For 
those borrowing from banks, this ratio is even more alarming: 28 percent have had 
health problems, 36 percent psychological problems (next figure). 
Figure 21: Other problems encountered by borrower in delay of payment 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
 
4.1.3 Results: OID index 
In adding perception, duration, and sacrifices (Table 7), we receive values 
representing the severity of OID in the sample. 
0 5 10 15 20 25
health problems
mental problems
relational problems
slump in business
loss of social status
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Table 7:  Components and manifestations of OID 
Components Description Manifestations  
Perception of OID No; yes 0; 1 
Duration of 
repayment problems 
0; <30 days; 30-89 days; 90 - 179 days; 
180 - 365 days; > 365 days 0 – 5 
Sacrifices Non; moderate; tangible; severe; fatal 0; 2; 4; 6; 8 
Other problems Health; psychological; relational; social status; business 0-5 
 
Values are categorized into levels of OID from none to very severe (Table 8). This 
allows us to estimate the prevalence of OID among those FI borrowers who are in 
default of payment and, ultimately, to quantify the problem of OID in Kinshasa. In the 
sample, 57 percent fall into the category “over-indebted” or worse, meaning that 
repayment problems have persisted for more than 30 days and borrowers have made 
sacrifices that are at least tangible. Borrowers in this category consider themselves 
over-indebted and have run out of coping strategies to meet due dates. They are 
often traumatized by debt collection practices and have problems of social nature 
(loss of social status or relational problems). 
Table 8:  Categories of OID 
Values Severity of OID Examples Percentage of sample 
0 none no delay; no sacrifices; no problems 8 
0-10 at risk 
Delay of less than 30 days 
& moderate sacrifices 
& relational problems 
35 
1-20 over-indebted 
self-perception: over-indebted 
& delay of 30-89 days 
& tangible sacrifices 
28 
21-30 increased OID 
self-perception: over-indebted 
& delay of 30-89 days 
& tangible sacrifices 
& psychological problems 
11 
31-40 severe OID 
self-perception: over-indebted 
& delay of 90-179 days 
& severe sacrifices 
& psychological problems 
& health problems 
12 
> 41 very severe OID 
self-perception: over-indebted 
& delay of more than 180 days 
& fatal sacrifices 
& psychological problems 
& health problems 
8 
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4.2 Factors contributing to over-indebtedness 
The severity of OID in Kinshasa is determined by various factors. Among the most 
important of these factors are; the type of financial service provider, the loan balance, 
whether the borrower received the amount requested and whether the borrower has 
multiple loans. 
• Individuals in delay of payment and borrowing from banks seem more severely 
over-indebted than borrowers with other FIs (Figure 22): 74 percent of them 
are over-indebted or worse (value higher than 11) compared to 44 percent of 
borrowers with cooperatives and 46 percent of borrowers with MFIs. 
Figure 22: OID by type of provider 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
 
• OID is less common among borrowers in loan groups (47%) than among 
individual borrowers (61%). 
• Having multiple loans exacerbates OID: 67 percent of borrowers with multiple 
loans are over-indebted or worse, compared to only 54 percent of borrowers 
with one loan. 
• MSMEs rated as “over-indebted” or worse (see table 8) have an average loan 
balance of 6,320 dollars. For those merely at risk of OID or without problems, 
the average loan balance is 2,360 dollars. The portion of those categorised as 
“over-indebted” increases with borrowers’ loan balance (less than 1,000 dollars: 
43%; 1,000-5,000 dollars: 55%; 5,000-10,000 dollars: 67%; more than 10,000 
dollars: 83%; Figure 23). 
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Figure 23:  Degree of OID by loan balance 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
 
• Rationing of loan balances is a common method to reduce the risk of OID: 62 
percent in the sample did not receive the balance requested (Figure 24). 
However, those who did receive the amount requested had less problems 
repaying (47%). 
Figure 24:  Received / did not receive requested loan balance 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
 
• As discussed in chapter 3.4.5, the automatic increasing of loan balances each 
cycle can contribute to the OID risk. 
• On average, balances doubled between the first and current cycle (Figure 25). 
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Figure 25:  Increase of loan balance between cycles 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
 
Neither gender, nor age or level of education or household size seem to influence the 
severity of OID: 
• Men (53%) and women (60%) suffer equally from OID. 
• OID occurs in all age categories. However, less entrepreneurs between 49 
and 58 years faced increased OID or worse (17%) than those between 39 and 
48 (36%) or those between 29 and 38 (30%). 
• The portion of borrowers categorised as “over-indebted” (or worse) is similar 
among entrepreneurs having finished secondary school without diploma (61%) 
and those who went to university and obtained (61%) or did not obtain a 
diploma (57%). Only those who finished secondary school with a diploma have 
a slightly smaller portion of OID (47%) in their group. 
The severity of OID is influenced by the sector of work, the number of loan cycles 
and whether the household can rely on a secondary livelihood: 
• Petty trade (43% over-indebted) and services (50% over-indebted) are 
similarly concerned by OID. 
• Much like borrowers in delay of payment, over-indebted entrepreneurs are 
usually in the third or fourth loan cycle.  
• 40 percent of over-indebted borrowers are not their household’s only source of 
income. Often the secondary salary can help to repay loans. 
One third of borrowers had heard of borrowers with repayment problems before 
requesting a loan and, despite their problems, 78 percent stated that they would 
recommend taking out a loan. Knowing bad cases or having problems oneself does 
not seem to serve as a warning against financial service products. 
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4.3 Conclusions: over-indebtedness in the sample 
In this paper, the OID index was developed on the basis of a qualitative definition 
which focuses on sacrifices and coping strategies. According to this index, 57 percent 
of the sample are over-indebted or worse (Figure 26). 
The degree of OID increases with the loan balance. MSMEs that are over-indebted or 
worse received an average loan balance of 6,320 dollars. The rationing of the loan 
balance seems counterproductive as a protection against OID. This was shown by 
the fact that borrowers who received less than the loan balance requested were more 
often affected by OID. Furthermore, automatic increasing of loan balances each cycle 
can contribute to OID because increases often occur without a sound analysis of the 
borrower’s profile. This automatic increase is much less prevalent for credit groups. 
As a consequence, borrowers in loan groups are less severely indebted than 
individual borrowers. Finally, having multiple loans exacerbates OID. 
Neither gender, age, level of education, household size nor the number of sources of 
income within a household seem to play a significant role for the severity of OID. The 
sector of work and the loan cycle appear to play a subordinate role. 
Figure 26:  Severity of OID 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
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5 Assessment of over-indebtedness in Kinshasa 
In this chapter we present and discuss existing practices used in financial inclusion to 
detect and reduce the risk of OID. The chapter brings together the assessment of the 
OID risk (chapter 1) and the severity of OID in Kinshasa. Different causes for OID put 
forward by experts are described and classified for the supply and the demand side. 
Exogenous factors, inspired by the model used by Schicks (2010, chapter 2) will also 
be discussed.  
5.1 Risk and degree of over-indebtedness in Kinshasa 
“After the rescheduling of debt, interests multiplied more and more” 
“I was ill, not working, without any resources” 
“The loan is the rope around my neck” (borrowers) 
The previous chapters have shown that the risk of OID in Kinshasa is elevated and 
that existing cases of OID tend to be serious. However, the relative prevalence of the 
phenomenon is low because few people in the DRC currently make us of financial 
products (perhaps 5% have a bank account; see Le Phare 2013 ; Financial Afrik 
2013 ; BCC 2012). Yet, signs for a future OID crisis should not be ignored. 
Particularly worrying is the increase of the PAR ratio in central markets of Kinshasa 
and for some FIs as well as the rapid growth of financial inclusion in the capital. 
Serious measures are needed to reduce the risk of OID and to establish better 
consumer protection. At present, consequences for those in debt are serious, both in 
social and economic terms. Late fees added to the debt often exacerbate the 
borrower’s inability to overcome over-indebtedness. 
In the DRC, debt is considered a character flaw by many (Exp13). This means that 
for borrowers, intrusion of loan officers into their personal life is very shameful. This 
anxiety becomes more existential when borrowers are facing seizure of their 
property. According to experts, repayment problems have already led to suicides 
(Exp19; Exp28). If catastrophes like Andhra Pradesh are to be avoided, if FIs are to 
take their social objectives seriously and if the sector’s reputation is to be saved, the 
efforts to reduce the OID risk must be reinforced. 
5.2 Different causes of over-indebtedness 
Chapter 2.3 has shown different factors contributing to OID: lenders can increase the 
risk, borrowers can make bad choices which contribute to OID risk, and external 
factors can also push a borrower into OID (Schicks 2010; Figure 2). Interviews 
conducted in Kinshasa demonstrated various causes and dynamics of OID from 
different points of views. These causes will be discussed in the following sections. 
56 Assessment of over-indebtedness in Kinshasa 
 
5.2.1 External factors / weak governance / weak institutions 
Many exogenous factors can contribute to OID, in particular a lack of supervision and 
weak institutions. 
Lack of consumer protection 
Fragility of the state implies that certain reforms, e.g. concerning consumer 
protection, have been implemented only in party or not at all (CGAP 2013). Despite 
efforts of state regulation on the side of the BCC and despite the relatively small size 
of the sector of financial inclusion, the presence of international institutions and 
different efforts to modernize the sector have remained unsuccessful in curbing the 
growing risk of OID. The absence of a credit information centre and the lack of an 
efficient legal system contribute to provisional practices that are in part illegal (illicit 
seizing of household goods or merchandise) (3.3.4) and at odds with rules of 
consumer protection (Exp11; LO5; LO8).  
Limited economic scope 
As explained in chapter 3.3.2, business-owners operate in an economically 
precarious context. Their leeway as borrowers is limited by the FIs’ focus on trade 
and service (as opposed to production and processing) and existing business  
(as opposed to new businesses, start-ups). Thus, the majority of borrowers pursue 
short-term strategies of buy-and-resell that bear little innovation and face much 
competition. 
This competition, combined with vulnerability and little purchasing power, can 
negatively affect businesses. They must cope with strong variations in income 
between good and bad months. Borrowers in our sample reported that they earned 
on average 2.4 times more in good months than in bad months. At the same time, it 
is hard for businesses plan ahead and invest at a given moment. Furthermore, over 
60 percent of borrowers interviewed are the only person in their household earning 
money (average number of household members: 4.6) and one third does not manage 
to put money aside (following figure). 
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Figure 27:  Economic scope / vulnerability of MSMEs 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
 
Weak governance 
“There are always accidents, and cases of merchandise or money being stolen. 
Borrowers pay an acquaintance to buy merchandise in Dubai or China  
and then are surprised when the person disappears. In other cases  
the police demolishes their market stall or even borrowers’ living quarters.  
However, for me the fault is with the borrowers as it is their responsibility  
to be prudent with their property and business”  
(loan officer on causes of OID among her borrowers, LO5) 
When explaining repayment problems, interviewed borrowers frequently mentioned 
contingencies and external factors. Inadequacies at the governance level form the 
backdrop for their problems in running a business and managing a loan. Certain 
deficiencies tend to more severely affect specific groups of borrowers (see Figure 28). 
For example, power cuts are difficult to manage especially for those who produce or 
process food. Problems in transport and customs as well as delivery delays affect the 
vast portion of borrowers who work in trade. The same group is affected by the 
DRC’s volatile economy which diminishes buyers’ purchasing power and in turn 
negatively affects traders who are dependent on demand (Exp5).  
MSMEs increase their own vulnerability through risky business practices. These 
include travelling far with large amounts of cash to purchase merchandise/goods or 
giving large amounts of money to middlemen who can be tempted to disappear with 
the money. These methods are used because borrowers don’t see any other ways of 
running their business. 
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Figure 28:  Causes for repayment problems - MSMEs 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
 
Micro-businesses in particular suffer from a lack of protection against red tape or 
harassment. In the context of the “Kin Propre” campaign to combat the informal 
sector, policemen destroy market stalls and burn merchandise of sellers deemed 
informal. In the sample, it was particularly borrowers with small loans who were 
affected by such destructive practices. 35 percent of those with loans under 1,000 
dollars (average 608 dollars) named “Kin proper” as the reason why their problems 
for repayment began.  
Apart from these negative framework conditions for economic activity, shortcomings 
on the part of institutions further negatively affect borrowers’ ability to repay: 
• The monopoly of the public insurance provider SONAS limits borrowers’ 
capacities to insure themselves against accidents, illnesses or other risks 
(Exp24); 
• Public officials cannot rely on receiving their salaries on time and develop 
secondary activities on the side, no matter their level of managerial abilities 
(Exp17); 
• The lack of a functioning credit information system has generated a flawed 
information base on borrowers (see 3.3.4). 
5.2.2 Supply side 
Consequences of competition 
The role of the supply side and the consequences of competition between FIs on OID 
are dealt with in chapter 3.3.5. Analyses of borrower capacities are difficult and often 
made on the basis of flawed information. As previously described, loan officers are 
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often overwhelmed with their workloads which further contributes to poor evaluations 
of borrowers’ capacities. In some cases, loan officers are not sufficiently trained or 
experienced so they have trouble understanding needs and motivations on the side 
of borrowers (Exp5; Exp11; Exp27).  
“Oftentimes loan officers are still children. They are very young and have  
never run a business of their own. Providers are often unprofessional  
conduct and sloppy analyses”  
(a borrower) 
Competition between FIs may result in a high rate of turnover among loan officers as 
they are attracted by higher salaries offered by the competition (Exp2; Exp5). For 
example, microfinance and commercial banks can pay higher salaries and offer other 
chances of advancement than cooperatives and MFIs (Exp1). At 350 dollars per 
month, payroll costs for a loan officer are already high in Kinshasa, and the salaries 
paid by banks are even higher and thus not feasible for MFIs and cooperatives who 
lose their staff to banks. This in turn contributes to a lack of professionalism among 
loan officers of cooperatives and MFIs (Exp4; Exp7).  
Inflexible and maladjusted products 
The risk inherent in microfinance and financial inclusion manifests itself in high 
interest rates (chapter 2.1). As a result, successful entrepreneurs with good under-
standing of financial products (who would make good borrowers) decide against 
credits (FG4). The burden of this adverse selection remains for the most part with the 
more vulnerable borrowers who do not have the capacity to detect hidden costs and 
who do not have reserves or contacts to raise capital elsewhere and at better 
conditions (Exp14; Exp7). Trainings centres and business associations reproach FIs 
for lacking creativity in product supply, the willingness to take risks and to develop 
more diverse products (Exp19; Exp28; FG4). The above-mentioned successful 
entrepreneurs believe that FIs are contributing to an increased risk of OID by 
attracting “bad” borrowers of the same economic segment (Exp4). 
Rigid loan conditions 
The rigidity of loan conditions and abusive debt collection practices (5.3) are at odds 
with the economically precarious context of borrowers and can exacerbate repayment 
problems. 
When the business goes bad, borrowers are often no longer capable of adhering to 
inflexible loan conditions. Delays in repayment are sanctioned through late fees that 
often exceed the ability to repay. On the whole, FIs seem to pursue a supply-based 
rather than demand-based approach (Exp11). 
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“The institution is never ill, it does not know grief” (common phrase among 
interviewed borrowers) 
 
5.2.3 Demand side 
Socioeconomic pressure as well as a flawed understanding of loan conditions and 
consequences of debt can lead to imprudent decisions on the part of borrowers 
(Schicks 2010). Some experts also point to socio-cultural factors to explain the 
prevalence of OID, particularly borrowers frequently underestimating credit oblige-
tions and lacking experience in adhering to due dates (Exp11; Exp17; Exp27). 
Borrower capacities 
Entrepreneurs targeted by financial inclusion seem to have little understanding of 
financial products and limited managerial abilities. However, the level of formal 
education in the sample was not particularly low: 25 percent had gone to university, 
18 percent had finished with a diploma, and 34 percent had obtained a diploma from 
secondary school. Yet, the understanding of financial products seemed rather low, 
despite long years of experience as entrepreneurs. For example, 78% of interviewed 
borrowers have carried out their current business for more than 7 years, an additional 
8% for 5 or 6 years. Below is a list of factors which underscore the overall lack of 
borrowers’ financial literacy: 
• The vast majority (91%) of borrowers have never had a training in business 
management – they learnt on the job. 
• 90 percent did not know how much interest they were paying on their credit – 
instead they knew how much they had to repay altogether. An understanding 
of interest rates is essential for the comparison of loan conditions. The lack of 
this information limits borrowers in their abilities to make sound borrowing 
decisions. 
• Information sessions between FIs and borrowers, in which FIs disseminate 
loan conditions and managerial skills, are rarely or never repeated after the 
first loan. Half of the sample had last taken part in such a session over 2 years 
before the interview and 13 percent had not had a session at all. 
• 43 percent of borrowers do not maintain cashbooks while the rest maintain 
only very basic records of their business sales. This lack of accountancy not 
only makes it hard for loan officers to correctly analyse a borrower’s ability to 
repay, it also negatively affects borrowers’ ability to plan, make long-term 
investments and take steps towards the development of a business plan. 
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Figure 29:  Financial literacy 
 
Source: Interviews with borrowers 
 
Many actors in the sector of financial inclusion confirm that the lack of a functioning 
credit information system undermines the quality of their borrower assessments. 
Loan officers and experts also criticize the fact that borrowers lack the ability to plan 
and analyse their needs and workload (Exp17; Exp19; Exp27; Exp28). 
“The majority (of borrowers), especially micro-businesses, do not know  
how to manage their business (…) they have no business plan and do not know  
how to spend the money in a sustainable way”  
(loan officer) 
Some FIs have reacted to this situation by offering support to borrowers in 
formalizing their businesses and in developing sound business plans (Exp13; Exp19; 
LO4).  This support is often carried out in cooperation with training centres. Some 
banks have even set up specific offices to advise MSMEs (Exp27; Exp13). However, 
the information provided by FIs is not always appreciated by borrowers and so far 
has not led to significant improvements in financial literacy. 
“The borrowers are not interested in the information sessions”  
(loan officer) 
Misuse of funds or deviation 
FI personnel regard misuse of funds as the main reason for OID (LO6; LO7; LO10; 
BM2). They assert that they try hard to make borrowers respect the initial business 
plan, but often fail to do so. A fifth of borrowers interviewed indicated that they hadn’t 
spent their loan as planned and 80% of these did so without informing their provider. 
Reasons for deviation are manifold. They include unforeseen expenses on illnesses 
or new investment opportunities that seem to promise faster and higher returns. 
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Some borrowers mentioned that having received a smaller loan than requested 
pushed them to deviate a part of their loan to develop a secondary activity or to 
invest in goods of less quality.  
As previously discussed, the majority of FIs target borrowers with low or medium 
income as there are too few medium and large enterprises in the market. This further 
increases the risk of misuse of loans because low revenue borrowers are more likely 
to spend a portion of their loan on consumption or non-sustainable goods (Exp27).  
“I unexpectedly had the occasion of buying a decent vehicle and decided  
to enter the transport business” 
“I was afraid of being punished for not having respected the contract” 
(borrowers)  
“One cannot glimpse inside the borrowers’ heads”  
(loan officer) 
Many lenders complain that borrowers often give false information and do not 
disclose other loans and debts when requesting a loan (BM1; BM5). They attribute 
this behaviour to borrowers’ ill intentions or hidden agendas. Lenders mention that 
borrowers often have a willingness to forgo repayment, to lie to lenders, or to play out 
one FI against the other. For this study, such borrower intentions were very difficult to 
verify. Borrowers’ willingness to provide false information forms the basis for loan 
deviation, i.e. for spending a loan in a way that was not agreed on with the provider. 
Loan officers seem to have little confidence in what borrowers say. They feel the 
need to monitor their borrowers’ activities closely and to apply pressure and 
intimidation techniques. This in turn can again incentivize borrowers not to disclose 
certain information in order to avoid punitive penalties. Overall, the combination of 
intimidating practices by loan officers and fearful borrowers with a willingness to lie 
has created an atmosphere of distrust between the two. 
Lack of bargaining power 
The majority of borrowers who are struggling with their loans blame the FIs for their 
problems. Given the competition among FIs for borrowers, it seems surprising that 
borrowers do not try to negotiate loan conditions with officers before taking out a 
credit. Interviews, however, showed that even with competition, borrowers generally 
had little bargaining power and didn't see themselves in a strong position to 
negotiate. It is FIs who decide on (rather uniform) payment schedules for all loans of 
similar balance. 
“Micro-business are not capable of comparing products. They do not understand. 
They just want to know how much they must pay each month”  
(loan officer) 
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“I have asked for a rescheduling of debt, I was too afraid of their reaction when they 
hear what happened to the money. I am afraid of being in debt”  
(Nar9) 
Social pressure 
The idea of redistributing wealth is widespread in the DRC and creates a social 
pressure on well-off persons to share and support the less fortunate. Often, 
borrowers do not reveal that the money at their disposal is borrowed for well-defined 
goals. They are regarded as affluent and expected to assure the well-being of other 
family members which then undermines their ability to repay (Exp13; LO3; BM5). In 
an economically precarious environment with many possible contingencies, this 
social pressure can increase the OID risk. More generally speaking, the tendency to 
become over-indebted depends on socio-demographic and economic traits of 
borrowers (Schicks 2010). The study in Kinshasa however does not show any 
significant differences in terms of OID severity between genders, age groups, or 
levels of education (chapter 1). 
5.2.4 Over-indebtedness - a system of complex causalities 
Overall, our hypotheses and the theoretical functional chain of OID developed in 
chapter 1.1 and 0  are well reflected in the empirical research carried out for this 
study in Kinshasa. Even though different actors interviewed for this study have 
different explanations for OID, certain important and seemingly typical correlations 
can be found. These same correlations have been recognised in all countries that 
have witnessed an OID crisis. It is therefore possible to benefit from lessons learned 
in the DRC and elsewhere in order to address existing warning signals for OID. 
5.3 Existing practices: managing the OID risk 
Actors in the financial sector dispose of different initial measures to identify and 
decrease the OID risk. In the following section, existing methods are described and 
discussed in order to identify best practices that have the potential to be adopted in 
the context of the DRC. 
5.3.1 Early-warning indicators 
In the DRC, lenders generally assess the risk of OID during the analysis of the 
borrower's files prior to granting a loan. Loan officers do so by following their FI's 
guidelines for borrower assessments. During this process, they verify the credibility 
and repayment ability of the borrower. Typical indicators used include the borrower's: 
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• Credit history, especially repayment of previous loans 
• Reputation in his/her neighbourhood 
• Stability in terms of permanent address and business development 
• Financial capacities / ability to repay 
• Business plan / aim of taking out a loan 
• Material goods to serve as collateral 
The Zurich study considers the fact that borrower analysis is done along specific, 
rigid criteria as positive. However, some entrepreneurs criticise the approach of 
following a borrower in his/her private life (FG4). As mentioned earlier, the quality of 
borrower analysis depends on a loan officer’s work conditions and bonuses for the 
recruitment of borrowers. Quality of borrower assessments thus differs among loan 
officers. Moreover, the quality of the analyses depends on the willingness and 
capacities of the borrowers to provide good information. The general lack of book 
keeping among borrowers makes it hard to correctly identify and quantify monthly 
repayment capacities. 
Another alarm signal for OID lies in the loan balance requested. If a borrower always 
takes the maximum amount offered by the FI even if it is not enough for his/her initial 
business plan, it is likely that he/she will deviate and/or request another loan with a 
different FI in order to reach the original amount requested (Exp4; LO11).  
After the granting of a loan, some FI employees attempt to minimize the risk of credit 
default by keeping a close watch on the borrower. To check whether the borrower is 
adhering to the payment schedule, they verify his/her stock of goods and see 
whether expenditures were made according to plan. 
In the absence of a credit information system, some FIs share information on 
borrowers through informal networks among loan officers and their superiors in order 
to prevent fraud. Especially for loan requests above 5,000 dollars, a borrower can be 
sure that the FI will exchange information with some of its competitors to know 
whether the potential customer has taken out other loans and if so how he/she 
performed. 
“As there is no credit information system, before granting a credit  
we gather information on the borrower by asking the other FIs.  
All this is done informally and not systematically, leaving many holes”  
(branch director of a MFI) 
Though this approach is understandable, it constitutes a breach of borrowers’ 
banking secrecy and is illegal.  
On the government level, there is still no system of early-warning indicators for OID in 
Kinshasa. An index of “bad borrowers” has existed since the 1970s but it has hardly 
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been used and has mostly been unable to prevent multiple lending. A more recent 
approach to better record keeping is the project to reform the “centrale de risque”. 
With the support of KfW, the project is in the process of developing new technologies 
and a unique identification system for borrower registration. This new system 
represents an important progress in tackling multiple lending and reducing the risk of 
OID (Exp6; Exp11; WS3). 
On the organizational front, Lubumbashi’s association of indebted, which supports 
borrowers in articulating their interests, seems to be an example to follow. Apart from 
giving a voice to borrowers, such an organization could also help to gather 
information on over-indebtedness, support the development of early-warning signals 
for OID and identify typical profiles of over-indebted borrowers. Furthermore, such an 
association could advise and support borrowers affected by OID (Exp17). 
5.3.2 Decreasing the risk of over-indebtedness 
Apart from attempts to correct existing OID tendencies there are measures to reduce 
the OID risk. These measures include: 
• Careful analysis of the ability to repay; 
• Close monitoring after granting a loan; 
• Debt collection practices; 
• Specialisation of loan officers and limitation of their workload; 
• Instructions and regulation; 
• Market studies to adapt and regionally expand products. 
Careful analysis of the ability to repay 
The risk of a borrower defaulting on a loan is considered before granting a loan. This 
means that lenders try to calculate a customer’s ability to repay as precisely as 
possible. As a measure of precaution, the ratio of revenue to expenditure is divided 
by two to estimate the maximum amount the borrower is able to put aside monthly to 
repay the loan (LO11). This approach is thought to allow for some scope for 
contingencies. However, this rationing of the loan balance requested can motivate 
borrowers to exaggerate their income or seek secondary loans with other providers. 
Another strategy to counter the rationing is to make multiple loan requests with 
different providers using the same collateral. With most FIs, multiple simultaneous 
loans to the same household and sometimes even any type of multiple loans are 
prohibited (Exp18; BM5). Yet, loan officers choose to ignore this standard if their 
economic analysis indicates sufficient borrower capacities to repay multiple loans 
(BM5).  
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A different approach to avoid OID is to limit the increase of the loan balance from 
cycle to cycle. Automatically increasing the balance is a widespread method to gain 
customer loyalty. However, this practice has proven risky because repayment 
problems mostly materialise after several cycles when borrower analyses become 
less meticulous and borrowers become more inclined to invest their loan in other 
channels than their primary activity. FIs therefore introduced rates that predetermine 
by how much a loan balance may grow (Exp4). It does not increase automatically but 
is subjected to another analysis to prove that the development of the business 
justifies an increase (Exp21; Exp30).  
According to the BCC, FIs have agreed to introduce degressive interest rates to ease 
the burden on borrowers. Some providers have already done so and begun to revise 
conditions to the benefit of borrowers (Exp7; Nar15). 
In the past, a common practice was to display photos and names of “bad borrowers” 
in different branches to warn against granting them new loans. These practices have 
been banned due to violations of the individuals’ rights (Exp17). 
Follow-up after loan disbursement  
Loan officers have action plans in the case that borrowers are in default of payment 
or even earlier, if borrowers display unusual behaviours (e.g. continuously being 
away from their point of sale, selling less, not responding to phone calls from the 
officer or not showing up for meetings (BM1; LO9). 
When a borrower is late, loan officers usually begin to remind him/her by phone and 
visit his/her point of sale or home. They try to understand the reasons for the late 
payment and to advise the borrower on how to resolve the issues and keep with the 
payment schedule. Even when default is due to contingencies and not due to bad 
intentions on the part of the borrower, late fees are immediately added to the overall 
amount to be repaid (borrower questionnaires). 
Debt collection practices 
When a borrower is unable to repay, there is usually the possibility to reschedule the 
debt. Interviews showed that this option is not available to all borrowers in default 
(borrower questionnaires). When the FI no longer believes that a borrower will repay, 
it proceeds to seize the borrower’s collateral, generally without initiating a legal 
process. Though this is de jure illegal, FIs have indicated that they feel forced to 
proceed this way due to the inefficiency and tardiness of the justice system (Exp2; 
LO8). Seizing collateral however creates new problems for FIs because they 
generally have little capacity to store or resell the seized goods (Exp2). Furthermore, 
the collateral is often worth only 30 to 50 percent of the debt (LO9). Proponents of a 
tough and rigid approach to debt collection see the seizing of collateral more as a 
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symbolic procedure. They support such approaches as educative interventions to 
discourage potential customers from requesting excessive amounts of loans and as a 
sign to other borrowers to honour their contracts (Exp11). 
Ultimately, FIs must write-off outstanding debt after 18 days (for some FIs 365 days) 
(BCC 2013). To avoid this loss of repayment, FIs should reschedule debt and adapt 
the payment schedule to the borrower’s situation. If possible, this should be done as 
early as possible, without pushing borrowers into a spiral of debt through late fees 
(LO11).  
FI branches try to reduce loan-related losses by encouraging their loan officers to 
minimize PARs. This additional pressure on officers is often passed on to their 
borrowers. Another way to stimulate repayment is to implicate guarantors who are 
obliged to pay the debt if the borrower is in default. Some FIs even reported consulting 
with a borrower’s clergyman to facilitate loan repayment (LO2). Furthermore, certain 
loan officers admitted that they systematically use psychological pressure on 
borrowers to avoid default (loan officer questionnaires). 
“In terms of follow-up of a loan, FIs do the following:  
a day after disbursement they visit the borrower. If he/she hasn’t spent  
the money as planned, the FI seizes all their merchandise. It sells all of it  
the same day to recuperate the money, (…) this is a strong signal. They are right  
to do so because the risk was calculated according to the business plan,  
so if the borrower deviates, the risk has changed. Or, they take the money  
from the guarantor who may then turn on the borrower. The mechanism is  
debatable but since the justice doesn’t work …”  
(expert) 
A particular way of using social pressure to assure repayment is joint liability in group 
loans. Even though this system has advantages (high repayment rate, no need for 
collateral), interviews with loan group members have raised some issues. An important 
issue mentioned by interviewees is the fact that members of a group often do not 
know each other prior to the loan. Group members have no information on the 
morality or quality of business of the other members and they simply join together to 
fulfil the number of members required by the FI (Nar15; Nar17).  
Streamline and specialize loan officers’ tasks 
With the intention of better debt collection, division of labour has started to take foot 
among FIs in Kinshasa. Institutions have introduced recovery departments whose 
sole task is to follow-up on borrowers in default (LO6; LO8). Their methods seem to 
be less abusive because recovery officers are given more scope for action by the FIs 
in negotiating solutions acceptable to all parties involved (LO8). They also do not feel 
the pressure of managing their portfolio quality. This division of labour reduces the 
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number of different tasks of loan officers, who in turn can improve the quality of their 
borrower assessments and customer support (Exp28; Exp19).  
Another good practice used by some FIs is to set more realistic goals for their loan 
officers, for example, by limiting the number of borrowers per loan officer. This 
enables loan officers to be more careful in their borrower selection and to provide 
more comprehensive borrower support, including counselling and support in loan 
management (Exp24; LO11). 
The FIs’ capacities to train their employees are widely divergent. All FIs examined 
insisted that they train their personnel well and make them attend training sessions. 
This however depends on values and approaches, sector workshops as well as 
workshops on consumer protection organised by FPM and CGAP (Exp1). FIs have 
different reputations when it comes to their follow-up and debt collection practices. 
Even within an institution, loan officers’ behaviour can vary considerably (Exp18). 
While some loan officers wish to create a trusting relationship with borrowers by 
getting to the bottom of their problems and developing a solution together, others 
prefer to rely on intimidation and rigor. One loan officer mentioned the challenge of 
officers in finding a balance between neither being too supportive nor too strict with 
their borrowers. 
“We must be careful not to appear too easy-going if we want to be taken seriously  
by the borrowers since they do compare. One must strike a balance: if you are  
too tough, you lose customers. Sure, many of them are victims of crime, 
contingencies but sometimes they simply lack prudence despite their experience, 
 and our efforts to warn them about consequences”  
(loan officer) 
Standards and regulation 
On the governmental level, the BCC has introduced guidelines for FIs to limit the risk 
of OID. These include the limitation of the PAR30 to 5 percent of the total loan 
portfolio and at least 15 percent equity capital. Recently, these regulations have led 
to some national FIs to shut down operations as their PARs were to high (Exp7; 
Exp5). 
Consumer credits are limited to one third of a borrower’s salary. This mechanism is 
effective, but only regulates consumer credits, which as we learned above only 
constitute a small percentage of the total loan portfolio. The measure can be abused 
by using the same salary as guarantee for multiple credits (cross-borrowing).  
The BCC and others are expect FIs to soon publish global interest rates and to make 
all hidden costs of a loan transparent in an effort to enable customers to compare 
loan conditions. As practiced in other countries, this should happen through a public 
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and an official website (Exp7). Regulations that require FIs to display effective loan 
interest rates and costs in a comprehensive manner have not been put into practice 
yet (CGAP 2013). 
Another set of regulations which could improve customer protection would be to 
introduce regulations of debt collection procedures as well as a compulsory 
complaints system which at present is only in the planning (Exp7; Exp18). FIs claim 
to address bad practices on their part through an “open door policy” (BM1) and using 
complaint boxes through which customer complaints can be reported. This feedback 
system does, however, not seem to be used on a large scale (FG4; FG3). 
“For five years I worked with a bank. It was like working with a wall:  
no advice, no support, no questions, and no complaints”  
(entrepreneur during a focus group discussion)  
Market studies and expansion 
The FPM and the FIs’ professional associations (ACB, ANIMF, APROSEC) have 
their own social performance indicators and offer trainings on standards for consumer 
protection. A detailed analysis, comprising recommendations for different plans of 
consumer protection in Congo’s financial sector, was commissioned by the BCC and 
carried out by CGAP. A report on the analysis was said to be published in 2014 
(Exp7 ; CGAP 2013). 
The FPM has also performed some market studies since 2012 to incentivise regional 
expansion of FIs beyond the DRC’s economic hubs. Because of bad debt repayment 
rates in contested markets, some FIs have actually begun to explore new markets 
outside of economic hubs. For instance, some FIs are moving away from Kinshasa 
and opening branches in less competitive provinces like Bandundu, Bas-Congo and 
Katanga. FI expansion beyond economic hubs is only just starting but some FIs have 
said that they see their future in underserved regions where market penetration is low 
(Exp24). Expansion to rural regions would encourage developing agricultural credit 
products, even if such products have not been too promising for now as FIs prefer to 
stay in urban areas where borrowers are not scattered (Exp24; Exp29). Another 
example of FI expansion is developing new products for specific target groups such 
as university students. 
Some FIs have started encouraging savings accounts among their borrowers to 
strengthen their financial reserves. This approach not only increases borrowers’ 
economic resilience, it also improves repayment rates and thus adds to the FIs’ 
liquidity and the stabilisation of their operations (Exp2; Exp30; BM1; BM7). 
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6 Conclusions and recommendations 
The chapters above have examined the risk and prevalence of OID in Kinshasa and 
described measures by different FIs to counter this problem. This final chapter takes 
up the arguments to conclude how one can proceed to reduce the OID risk on 
different levels of intervention. 
Risk of OID was shown to have various different causes which result from the 
government level (regulation and framework), the sectorial level, and the level of 
individual FIs and borrowers. Research findings from this study revealed the following 
causes to be the most influential factors in the increase of OID in Kinshasa and rising 
numbers of over-indebted borrowers: 
• Lack of a credit information system that is functional and efficient. 
• Weak implementation of central bank regulation. 
• Lack of professionalization among FIs despite efforts on the institutional, 
sectorial and government level. 
• Competition among FIs for the same market segment and lack of flexible and 
adapted products. 
• Insufficient borrower analysis which, despite many efforts, does not comprehen-
sively assess borrowers’ capacities or moral conduct. 
• Low financial literacy among MSMEs as well as precarious business practices 
and loan deviation caused by contingencies or hidden agendas. 
As described in the previous chapter, several institutions are making efforts to counter 
the shortcomings summarized above: 
• The “Centrale de risque” is in the process of being reformed. 
• The FPM and professional associations are urging FIs to implement reforms 
and respect international standards for consumer protection. 
• FIs are exploring new products and new regions to target unbanked clientele. 
Other FIs specialise in unbanked economic segments like micro-businesses. 
• FIs are increasing division of tasks among staff and introducing specialised 
units for the interaction with borrowers. 
• Entrepreneurs are beginning to organise to become more independent from 
financial service products and to attain more bargaining power. 
All of these efforts have begun to bear fruit but in the long term will not be sufficient to 
reverse the OID tendencies in Kinshasa. The research team suggest strengthening 
efforts on all levels in order to minimize the risk of an OID crisis (a table with an 
overview of the discussion follows at the end of the chapter): 
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Government level 
The “centrale de risque” (CdR) is a key element to prevent OID. FI employees and 
sector experts hope that its reform will enable the credit information system to 
monitor and limit the number of loans to be taken out by borrowers and reduce cases 
of fraud in the sector of financial inclusion. 
Consequently, the CdR’s steering committee (composed of representatives from 
different sections of the BCC and of members of FIs’ professional associations) 
should: 
• Speed up the launching of the reformed CdR; 
• Develop a manner of functioning and model of financing that doesn’t dis-
advantage cooperatives and MFIs; 
• Assure that the information disseminated by the CdR is correct and reliable; 
• Make transparent to FIs its progress and development and its planned manner 
of functioning (responsibility of associations); 
• Cooperate with the Ministry of the Interior and the provider of a unique 
identification system. 
The BCC has continuously extended its control over the sector of financial inclusion 
and its professionalization. In order to further strengthen the development of a well-
functioning sector of financial inclusion in the DRC, the BCC should adhere to the 
CGAP’s 2013 report on consumer protection by implementing the following: 
• Elaborate norms for the granting of loans (after the inauguration of the CdR) to 
assure a minimum of standards for borrower selection and analysis. These 
norms should be applied by all institutions operating in the MSME segment, 
namely cooperatives, MFIs, financial inclusion banks and commercial banks; 
• Develop and supervise an arbitration system to assure adequate debt recovery 
(mindful of lenders’ and borrowers’ interests). Professional associations  could 
cooperate in this process; 
• Assure information transparency on real prices of financial products, real costs 
of late repayment and possible recovery procedures; 
• Specify the type of statistical data that FIs need to provide and make 
accessible sector data and analyses. 
The possibility of offering any kind of insurance is extremely limited due to a 
monopoly held by SONAS, whose operating methods are hardly known and in whom 
consumers have little or no confidence (CGAP 2013). Abolishing this monopoly and 
developing a supply of better suited insurances against contingencies would give 
some stability to the otherwise precarious business environment in which entre-
preneurs operate (Exp24). Donors can cooperate with FIs to resolve problems resulting 
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from information asymmetries, transaction costs per insurance, challenges in the en-
forcement of legal contracts and the lack of diversification in the segment of micro-
insurances. In this regard, one could learn from promising approaches in other financial 
inclusion sectors where life, health, and weather insurances exist (Boúúart 2008). 
Successful savings programmes tend to have a good on-site support service and 
enable saving small amounts. They also require institutions with easy access to 
capital. The positive effect of savings is revealed when supply and micro-savings serve 
as a means of reaching new customers and as a security to grant credits (KfW 2010). 
The prerequisite of collateral continues to present an obstacle for many potential 
borrowers, and some entrepreneurs complain about the mistrust with which their loan 
requests are met (FG4; FG5). A guarantee fund, which would serve as an additional 
guarantee for entrepreneurs, could reduce this problem and lead to better financial 
inclusion. The French Development Agency (AFD) has developed a credit risk-
sharing scheme called ARIZ (support for the risk of financing private investment in 
AFD’s areas of operation) which could serve as a partner in the expansion of the 
sector’s guarantee offer. 
Government campaigns like “Kin Propre” require better communication and must be 
executed with more consideration of the situation of individuals affected by such 
measures. Regularising informal businesses and livelihoods can only work if viable 
formal alternatives are offered. As petty trade represents the only possible livelihood 
for many, measures like “Kin Propre” threaten the well-being of a vast economic 
segment of the population, and in the long run, social cohesion. Stakeholders in the 
sector of financial inclusion could try to influence government decisions to better 
protect their clientele. 
Sectorial level 
Adhering to international standards of social performance (SMART, SPTF) should be 
mandatory for all FIs in the DRC. At present, some FIs, but certainly not all, have 
validated the Smart Campaign. Actors in the sector of financial inclusion should step 
up efforts to improve standards and social performance of FIs – the reputation of the 
sector and the confidence the public places in it depend on the professionalism of all 
FIs. Organisations and professional associations that bring together FIs are in a good 
position to continue the process of modernisation towards increased social 
performance (Pykosvska 2011a; 2011b; Rotter 2012). These international standards 
should be complimentary to standards made by regulators. Internal audits can increase 
adherence to standards of conduct and strengthen interaction with borrowers. FI 
personnel are exposed to high pressure which prevents them from adhering to 
standards – the FPM could push them towards better consumer protection. 
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Transparency of loan conditions and actual costs of loans is imperative to enable 
borrowers to make choices based on correct information. Professional associations 
and other organisations implicated in the sector (e.g. the FPM) could insist that their 
members and partners display loan information in their branches that is easily 
comprehended by borrowers. 
The monopoly on market data prevents associations from collecting and analysing 
data on the sector and undermines their ability to better guide their members. The 
data collected by the BCC should be accessible by all sector stakeholders. Trainings 
for FI employees are in demand and help standardise the presently widely divergent 
practices by FIs.  
Organisations working in the sector of financial inclusion could support FIs in 
strengthening borrowers’ financial literacy. They could develop courses of instruction 
to strengthen information sessions and contribute to the elaboration of a national 
strategy for financial literacy. Public campaigns (posters, radio ads) to encourage 
responsible use of loans and better business management could be part of this 
approach. 
Sector stakeholders could also launch a debate on financial inclusion’s social targets. 
As discussed above, commercial targets have gained importance vis-à-vis social 
ones in the management tiers of FIs and could threaten the realisation of the latter. 
This in turn could undermine the sector’s reputation. 
Sector institutions could facilitate a process of discussing the relationship between 
social and economic targets. Certainly, those FIs supported by donors should be 
interested in discussing their balance of social and economic targets. The 
international discussion of development effectiveness (OECD 2011) could influence 
this discussion. As elaborated in chapter 3.5, economic sustainability and social 
performance can be complementary. Nonetheless, Congo’s financial inclusion sector 
seems to require subsidies or programmes to target low-income households. Support 
for FIs focussing on these target groups could be provided in the form of subsidies, 
facilitated re-financing, tax exemptions, guarantee funds or other favourable 
conditions (KfW 2010). Donors should condition their support for FIs to their 
adherence to social performance standards and the preservation of their social goals. 
Institutional level 
FIs should increase their efforts to reach new customers through market research 
rather than continuing to fight for borrowers in the same regions and segments. 
Market research could lead to a) better suited loan products for unbanked MSME 
(e.g. agriculture) and b) expansion into other regions of the country. Information on 
geographical and socio-economic market saturation could help to target appropriate, 
i.e. underserved markets (Chen et al. 2010). 
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It is possible that pilot phases of new products or in new regions will not immediately 
be profitable for FIs. Donors could support such initiatives if they bring the sector 
closer to financial inclusion and poverty-reduction. 
Financially literate entrepreneurs who, because of adverse selection and their 
understanding loan conditions, prefer not to request a loan under existing conditions, 
represent an attractive clientele for FIs. To better understand their needs, FIs and 
sector stakeholders should engage in a discussion with MSME representatives in 
order to develop flexible and suitable products (FG4). 
Debt recovery always has the potential to damage the relation between borrowers 
and FIs. Recovery practices should be based on certain norms so that borrowers do 
not exploit differences by repaying only those FIs considered “tough”. FIs should 
agree on standards for the recovery procedure. They should adhere to laws and 
refrain from illegal seizure of collateral (as it occurs at the moment). Particularly, they 
should delegate recovery to specialised units within their organisation so that loan 
officers can pursue their main tasks of recruiting new borrowers, creating and assessing 
borrower files and establishing a relation of trust and support with borrowers. 
Loan officers play a crucial role in the borrower-FI relation. In sufficiently large FIs, 
tasks should be divided among specific working units. This could enable specialisa-
tion and strengthen the quality of services. Specialisation could occur in recruitment, 
training, and consultation of customers, support and follow-up, customer analysis and 
recovery. Such a division of labour could help to avoid misallocation of loans and 
support business development. Furthermore, it could improve accounting practices 
which form the basis of analyses and prognoses for future loans. 
Loan officers should be offered more trainings, especially on codes of conduct, social 
targets, and best practices in customer protection. To support best practises, their 
borrower assessments should not be confined to quantitative/economic parameters 
but should also take into account qualitative analyses. Borrower assessment should 
similarly not be confined to economic estimates but include aspects of morality and 
behaviour to avoid misallocating loans. Also, sufficient time should be allocated for 
thorough data collection and analysis. 
Key elements of information sessions for borrowers are: how to calculate interest 
rates, consequences of defaulting and late repayment and advice on how to avoid 
and overcome business-related problems. Such sessions should take place before 
each loan cycle. 
Household / MSME level 
Management, financial literacy, and business practices are key elements for successfully 
managing a loan. These can be established through training programmes, education 
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in general and awareness-raising. The ministry of education, in cooperation with the 
BCC, sector representatives, and professional associations should develop a strategy 
for financial literacy on all levels (schools, media campaigns, awareness-raising events). 
Interested borrowers should have easier access to trainings in business management 
to improve their capacities for planning and monitoring their business. It is likely that 
only few entrepreneurs feel the need to partake in these types of trainings (FG5). To 
encourage participation, better loan conditions could be offered to entrepreneurs who 
apply tools and methods of improved management. Participation in training courses 
should be included as criteria for loan disbursement to honour these efforts and 
improve business practices. Professional associations should contribute to awareness-
raising among their members to increase professionalism in the sector in the long run.  
Generally, MSMEs could be reached by campaigns for savings and responsible credit 
use. At the same time the image of FIs and financial services would be improved in 
the long run and the number of entrepreneurs seeking a loan would be broadened. 
That way one would fully harness the development potential of access to finance. 
Table 9: Recommendations at a glance 
Action Principal actor Partners Time 
frame 
Government level       
Launch credit information system 
Unique identification system 
Inform and convince FIs 
Steering committee of the 
“central de risqué” (BCC, 
ACB, ANIMF, APROSEC) 
KfW 
Ministry of the 
Interior 
2014 
Develop norms for loan 
disbursement (borrower 
assessment; minimal information) 
BCC (microfinance and 
commercial banks) 
Professional 
associations 
FPM 
2014 
Development arbitration system for 
loan recovery and managing credit 
defaults 
BCC (microfinance and 
commercial banks) 
Professional 
associations 
FPM 
2014 
Standardise and publish information; 
accessibility of market data  
BCC (microfinance and 
commercial banks) 
FIs 
Professional 
associations 
FPM 
2014 
Develop national strategy for 
financial literacy 
Ministry of Education Ministry of Finance 
BCC 
GIZ 
Professional 
associations 
2014 
Revise “Kin proper” campaign 
Develop plan to regularise petty 
trade in a sustainable manner 
Fight corruption/red tape 
Kinshasa Administration Donors 2014 
Abolish insurance monopoly: 
diversify and stimulate competition  
Ministry of Finance SONAS 2014-15 
Assess feasibility of guarantee fund  Ministry of Finance  
BCC 
AFD, FPM 
Donors 
2014-15 
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Sectorial level       
Develop norms for acceptable debt 
recovery 
BCC 
Professional associations  
Consumer associations and  
MSMEs 
FPM 
FIs 
Donors 
2014 
Disseminate and support norms and 
standards for consumer protection 
Professional associations 
FPM 
FIs 2014 
Disseminate and support 
standardisation of data collection 
and publication by FIs 
Professional associations 
FPM 
FIs 2014 
Campaign for financial literacy 
(media, posters) 
Professional associations 
FIs 
Ministry of 
Education 
GIZ 
Training centres 
CCAM (design) 
2014 
Launch debate on commercial and 
social goals of financial inclusion 
sector  
Professional associations 
FPM 
Donors 
CCAM (theoretical 
debate) 
2014 
Institutional level       
Harmonisation of debt recovery 
practices via FIs while respecting 
sector instructions 
FIs Professional 
associations 
BCC 
2014 
Review system of analysing and 
assessing borrowers  
FIs CCAM (studies, 
consulting) 
FPM 
2014 
Streamline loan officer tasks and 
adapt assessment system 
 
FIs   2014 
Review system of continued training 
for loan officers  
FIs   2014 
Intensify monitoring of borrowers: 
animate MSMEs to partake in 
management and accounting 
courses  
FIs Training centres 2014 
Market studies on virgin markets 
(regional, sectorial) and develop 
new products 
FIs FPM 
MSME associations 
2014-15 
Render credit products more flexible FIs MSME associations 
Professional 
associations 
2014-15 
MSME level      
Contribute to the developing of a 
strategy for financial literacy 
Professional associations Ministry of 
Education 
2014 -
2015 
Contribute to a better management 
of business and loan 
Professional associations, 
training centres  
Professional 
associations, FIs 
2014 
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Table 10: Experts interviewed 
 Name Organisation Position 
Exp1 Patrick Kasuyi Advans  Responsible for training 
Exp2 Francois Lecuyer Advans Director General 
Exp3 Pathy Kalengayi Advans Sales Manager 
Exp4 Jean-Pierre Illunga ANIMF Secretary General 
Exp5 André Nkusu Zinkatu APROSEC Secretary General 
Exp6 Madame Mpunga BCC Responsible for credit information 
system 
Exp7 Marie José Ndaya Illunga BCC Deputy Director of the Department of 
Supervision of Financial 
Intermediaries 
Exp8 Aubin Lubasu BILO Responsible for higher risk products 
Exp9 Fabrice Nzuka BIC Business Manager 
Exp10 Dominique Mbaya CADEA Educator 
Exp11 Frédéric Kalala CCAM Professor / researcher 
Exp12 Jenny Musikingala CCAM/ 
Ecobank 
Researcher 
Exp13 J-R. Finunu Samba 
Justin Kuyangumunu 
Bomba 
COGEFOR Director General 
Head of Programs 
Exp14 Dieudonné Kasembo 
Nyembo 
FEC National chairman of commission for 
SME marketing 
Exp15 Anuarite Kutungulula Finca Regional Manager 
Exp16 King Kingwaya Finca CEO 
Exp17 Jean-Médard Muteba FPM Project Manager 
Exp18 Florian Berndt 
Francis Nzondomyo 
GIZ Principal Technical Advisor 
Exp19 Junoir Kalonji IECD/RDC Head of Kasavubu branch 
Exp20 Pascal Nsarhaza Mecreco Coordinator Mecreco/East 
Exp21 Germaine Dibula Mufesakin Director general 
Exp22 Pascal Gilles N’kita Opportunity Chief Operating Officer 
Exp23 Martin Khiendo Oxus RDC Director of operations 
Exp24 Eric Marquer Oxus RDC Director general 
Exp25 Monah Andriambalo PASMIF Technical Advisor 
Exp26 Nadege Bula-Bula Ayitre ProCredit Responsible for higher risk unit 
Exp27 Jean-Philippe Mukuaki SFI/IFC Coordinator of program to support 
SMEs in the DRC  
Exp28 Alice Ngoma Manzueto UMOJA Director 
Exp29 André Radloff ProCredit Director general 
Exp30 Yvonnick Peyraud Advans Director general 
Exp31 Cathy Mbungani KfW  Advisor for financial and private sector 
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Table 11: Focus group discussions 
FG1 Loan officers with Opportunity 
FG2 Loan officers with Mecreco 
FG3 Loan officers with Advans 
FG4 Entrepreneurs with FEC 
FG5 Entrepreneurs with “RDC enterprises” 
 
Table 12:  Narrative interviews 
Nar1 Borrower with bank and MFI 
Nar2 Borrower with bank 
Nar3 Borrower with bank 
Nar4 Borrower with bank 
Nar5 Borrower with two banks 
Nar6 Borrower with bank 
Nar7 Borrower with cooperative (group loan) 
Nar8 Borrower with cooperative 
Nar9 Borrower with MFI 
Nar10 Borrower with cooperative 
Nar11 Borrower with MFI (group loan) 
Nar12 Borrower with MFI (group loan) 
Nar13 Borrower with cooperative 
Nar14 Borrower with cooperative 
Nar15 Borrower with cooperative 
Nar16 Borrower with cooperative 
Nar17 Borrower with MFI (group loan) 
 
Table 13: Interviews with branch managers 
BM1 Advans 
BM2 ProCredit 
BM3 Finca 
BM4 Finca 
BM5 Mecreco 
BM6 Opportunity 
BM7 Opportunity 
BM8 Mufesakin 
 
Table 14:  Workshops 
WS1 Inception workshop Kinshasa 
WS2 Internal workshop discussion of findings - Kinshasa 
WS3 Final workshop Kinshasa 
WS4 Final workshop in Frankfurt am Main 
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Stories of over-indebted borrowers 
In the following chapter we have selected 7 stories from 17 narrative interviews with 
borrowers in default of payment. The cases differ widely: some are typical, some 
rather exceptional. They show the range of problems borrowers can encounter: 
A: Papa Laurent (Nar7) 
Member of credit group with loan of 330 dollars to expand his business as a butcher; 
must repay for 2 members of the group who ran out of money; weak revenue due to 
regular power cuts which prevent him from using machines; feels pressure from 
frequency of instalments. 
Laurent (43) has worked as a butcher for a long time. He buys commodities (spices, 
meat) and turns them into finished products in a butchery near his home. His work is 
inhibited by frequent power cuts which make the meat spoil and his sales drop. An 
engine-generator is out of the question because it is too expensive. Upon the 
recommendation of a friend, Laurent has recently become member of a credit group 
with an MFI. He hoped that this support would help him realise his dream of having 
his own butchery. In the course of 5 or 6 credit cycles he planned to buy machines 
and a fridge to produce more independently. In his credit group of 10, Laurent just 
received his second loan, with a balance of 330 dollars. As the MFI had agreed to 
double the first loan of 300 dollars he was very disappointed when he only received 
30 dollars more. Every 2 weeks he pays instalments of 45 dollars, which he finds too 
frequent: “If only I had to pay each 4 weeks that would give me some leeway, some 
peace”. 
One day the problems began: “Though the conditions were well explained, two 
members of our group could no longer repay, so we had to pay their share. We are 
not doing too well ourselves but we know they have very little and decided to pay. I 
would rather have an individual credit but that poses too many obstacles, like a 
business permit or proof of residence. As for me, I also find it difficult to repay. Often 
you end up paying with money that was intended for school fees or food. Sometimes 
you cannot pay the fees and the children are expelled.” The group members all 
complain about the biweekly repayment schedule which they say doesn’t allow them 
to produce and sell enough to make profits, repay, and develop. “We suggested 
repaying each month. The loan officers have informed the branch managers but 
nothing has changed.” 
Martin (28), the loan officer, can tell that the group does not want to remain with the 
MFI. He believes that he can hold on to them for another cycle or two but that the 
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likely loan increases between 40 and 100 dollars (depending on savings and 
repayment) are not enough to make them stay. For this reason he is trying to 
convince management to offer new products and listen to the needs of borrowers: 
“With the competition at hand, if we don’t have offer new products and better 
conditions, it will be impossible to get people interested. They will be recruited by 
other FIs. For us loan officers this is a problem: how can we meet our quotas, our 
annual targets, if our products are not competitive?” The loan officer recommends 
how to do better: borrowers need large stock, cash reserves or secondary sources of 
income to deal with contingencies. Of course we analyse their cash-flow but that 
remains a very rough calculation. These analyses do not account for the unexpected. 
The financial literacy trainings we offer help, borrowers begin to fill in inventory 
records and note their revenue. But these courses are not available to all, they are 
not really a priority for borrowers. If on the day of the training they could be selling 
something, they will always chose to do so. It is therefore our job to visit the 
borrowers and motivate them and provide the right courses. Otherwise we will just sit 
and wait for nothing.” 
All the same, Laurent continues to cope with the situation as much as possible: “if the 
situation doesn’t change, I think I might look elsewhere, with other providers that offer 
more time between instalments and a consistent loan balance. For now I am staying 
with this institution, hoping that things will get better since they have promised to 
review their terms this year. Though I have not received the requested amount I am 
hoping that in the third cycle the loan balance will be what I hoped for. If the 
conditions do not change in the next cycle we will leave this institution. I have been 
told that FINCA offers one month of grace period which seems fair to me.” 
B: Maman Angélique (Nar12) 
Theft of 1,800 dollars intended for buying goods; dispute with loan officer who does 
not believe this story; confrontation with branch manager who sees a lack of respect 
for loan officer; difficulty repay the debt due to weak demand. 
Maman Angélique (45) sells women’s clothing on the grand market and is member of 
a credit group with an MFI. In August 2013, the MFI granted her a loan of 1,500 
dollars to expand her business. Some weeks after the disbursement, 1,800 dollars 
were stolen from the shop. The sum was destined for buy new cloth in Benin. When 
Angélique tried to explain this to her loan officer the situation escalated: “I told him 
that a woman had stolen my money while examining the boutique – but he didn’t 
want to hear my story, he thought I was lying. This rascal treated me like a child, he 
insulted me in front of my husband and neighbours. My husband was furious!” 
Mathieu (29), the loan officer, tells a different story: “Angélique is the president of a 
savings group but for some time now she has not been repaying her debt so I went to 
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investigate. I spent much time with her to understand her situation, the decline in 
demand. We decided to change her repayment schedule. I always tell her she must 
respect the contract. But then she didn’t respect the new schedule either. Every time 
she tells me she will come the next day to pay but she never comes, so I have to go 
find her on the market and see what is going on. This last time she spoke about a 
theft but I later learned she had spent one month in Benin – an entire month! When I 
confronted her the lady got very angry. I am responsible for 177 borrowers and this is 
the first time I’ve had problems like these. Every time I visit here I pass by endless 
borrowers who repay on time. If she really wanted to repay she could do it.” 
Since the theft, Angélique has difficulty repaying 1,880 dollars she owes. Oftentimes 
the loan officer and recovery officer make announced visits, even several times per 
week. She is ashamed in front of the family and neighbours. As her relationship with 
the loan officer is soured, she went to speak to his superior, the branch manager. 
The latter supports his loan officer: “When will she repay? I think she has another 
loan elsewhere. Borrowers like that always have hidden agendas. Apparently she 
spent a month in Benin so she can afford the expensive round trip but cannot afford 
repaying the loan? Whenever the officer goes to collect instalments, she gives him 50 
dollars instead of 235 that she owes us each month. This has been going on for 
some time now.” 
Despite her problems, Angélique remains optimistic: “Yes, there are problems but still 
the loan has helped me. I don’t remember how many days I am late but I will pay the 
remaining debt. This is the first loan I have requested with this institution. Next time I 
will be more careful. But I also think that the customer should be king and the FIs 
should ask for an interest rate at which the borrower is still able to repay. And of 
course you must treat the borrowers well and not like little children.” 
C: Maman Angeline (Nar3) 
The borrower was affected by a series of events beyond her power which prevented 
her from repaying a loan; she is no longer sure of the amount of debt or the delay in 
days; she is in despair and cannot think of how to repay the debt without taking out 
another loan. 
Mme Angeline has 6 children which she has been raising alone ever since their 
father fell ill and moved to stay with his family in a village. When she and a child also 
became ill she decided to request a loan: “I had no resources and a neighbour 
advised me to ask for a loan. She lent me the 5 dollars I needed as guarantee. Then 
the ill child died and the trouble really began. But in spite of the problems, I always met 
the deadlines. Then, two months later, my house burnt down and I lost everything”. 
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Now the family lives in a tent which the neighbours provided: “I sold two clothing 
items that they gave me so I could use the money to order bread for sale.” Angeline 
earns 4,000 CF per day, half of which she puts aside to repay the debt. As there is no 
money for school fees, the children no longer attend classes. Sometimes the family 
doesn’t have much to eat and there are not enough resources to rebuild a house or 
shack. “That is the worst. I would need 150 dollars for that. But the FI didn’t even give 
me the 100 dollars I asked the first time. The bank should give the amount requested. 
After selling a large amount of goods I could build a house.” 
After the fire, she recounted the events to her loan officer but didn’t ask for a 
rescheduling of debt. “I was too scared of their reaction. I will have finished paying 
my debt with the following instalment, but I am not sure whether there will be other 
fees to pay”. 
To cope she has taken out an informal loan but is not happy with the interest rate: on 
a loan of 33 dollars she will repay 49 dollars (i.e. an interest rate of 50%). For this 
reason she hopes to receive another loan with the MFI: “I have no family support. 
And I cannot ask my neighbours to help me again. If I don’t manage to get another 
loan I won’t know what to do. The bread bakers are on strike at the moment. So I have 
nothing to sell. Maybe I will sell sachets of water. I have no idea at the moment.” 
D: Maman Francine (Nar14) 
Borrower in her 5th cycle with a cooperative; decline in revenue due to strong compe-
tition; cannot manage to repay instalments on time so late fees have accumulated. 
For several years Mme Francine has been running a restaurant and a boutique. As 
her loan officer explains: “When she received a loan to expand her gastronomic 
business, there were no other restaurants nearby. I don’t know whether it was 
jealousy but just afterwards two or three neighbours also opened restaurants. They 
are all offering the same food. She now has to share customers with the others”. To 
beat the competition, Francine decided to apply for another loan to increase the stock 
of goods and renovate the restaurant and boost business. She is well experienced 
with using credits for investment. “This is my 5th loan and I have never had problems 
repaying. I heard about microcredits during a church meeting. A woman there 
explained to us the advantages of working with a loan.” 
Her loan officer explains how the circumstances have inhibited her ability to repay: 
“the competition has caught her off guard. Also she became ill. It was then that the 
delay began. Her husband’s company ran into trouble so he he also has no secure 
revenue. This issue can take a long time to be resolve because justice here only 
works for those who have money.” 
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Francine however sees the cause of her problems in rigid repayment terms of the 
cooperative: “in the past, the loan duration was one year. We did not feel the weight 
of the debt on our shoulders. I was able to repay 400 dollars each month. But now 
the FI has decided to shorten the duration to 6 months. In this shorter period you do 
not have enough time to sell your products, to earn money for repayment. And if you 
don’t manage, you pay one dollar late fee per day, which can hurt a lot.” Francine 
feels intimidated, like she cannot negotiate with her lender: “I did not request a 
rescheduling of debt. With their way of speaking to you, it doesn’t feel like you have 
any say. If I had received the amount I applied for, everything would be better.” 
As she is unable to meet monthly instalments, she has started paying as much as 
she can, as her loan officer recalls: “the total amount was 2,000 dollars, so she should 
pay 384 dollars per month. But she only pays 50, sometimes 100 dollars per month. 
Apparently all the other restaurants closed again after only two months so we hope 
that this will make her situation improve.” 
Mme Francine sees the consequences of the situation: “I can no longer pay out the 
salaries so I am working by myself. And at home there is also trouble. I cannot give 
my children any money”. Her loan officer confirms: “these last months she lost weight 
with all these problems. She is no longer the same personas before.” 
Despite all the issues, Francine would not hesitate to take out another loan after this 
one: “my children have told me never to apply for a loan again. But if you work hard 
to repay and save a little, the loan can be very helpful. Also I do not want to use my 
savings account, neither to repay nor to invest. Next time, I will save more, calculate 
better and really analyse purchases and sales. Sometimes prices increase - one 
must consider this in the calculations. The reality is always different from what we 
learn in theory.” 
E: Papa Dieudonné (Nar1) 
Theft, multiple loans, lack of legal protection for tenants – Dieudonné’s troubles are 
caused by personal mistakes, by a willingness to take risks and lie to lenders; added 
to his own faults are flaws in the system; he hopes to prevail with help from family 
members and through working with a brewery that would allow him to restart his 
business and repay the debt. 
Dieudonné took out a loan of 6,000 dollars with an MFI and simultaneously 3,000 
with a bank. “I had repaid almost everything with my usual institution, so I didn’t feel 
the need to report outstanding loan when I applied for another loan with a bank to 
boost my business. They granted the credit after discussing my business plan and 
assessing the collateral. Now I must still repay around 1,500 dollars to the bank and 
a small amount to the MFI.” 
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I found a good place to open up a bar-restaurant just next to a hotel with many 
guests. But then the hotel owner decided to tear down the building and construct 
something else. All my customers disappeared and new ones didn’t come because of 
the dust from the construction. Despite this decline in business the owner of my 
restaurant wasn’t willing to lower my rent. Repaying became more and more difficult.” 
He has since moved his restaurant: his sister living abroad knows the owner of an 
abandoned tourist hotspot near the Congo River. Dieudonné was able to realise his 
plans: “I must invest – the buildings are abandoned – and apart from a little paint job I 
have not been able to do much”. He complains that the bank offers little support: “I 
discussed my problem and my move with the loan officer. But they didn’t give any 
legal support or business advice. They are only interested in the repayment and keep 
calling me to remind me of instalments. They should rather grant me some flexibility 
and accord me time to restart the business.” He feels dependent on lenders: “The 
banks decided on conditions, you cannot negotiate with them. We entrepreneurs are 
in a weak position. They do not offer a rescheduling of debt, no flexibility. I was 
hesitant to take out a loan out of fear of being stuck – repayment is such a stress it 
can kill you. 
He hopes to begin afresh with the support of a brewery. “As I am a long-time client I 
was able to get a contract for stock and equipment. They are supporting my 
establishing of a new restaurant. I will try to repay as soon as possible after opening 
the place. I want nothing more to do with the bank.” Dieudonné insists that his 
troubles do not stem from carelessness or bad decisions: “What could I have done 
when the owner destroyed the hotel – and my business along with it? In a developed 
country I would have sued him, at least to lower the rent. But here the owner is 
unchallenged. I suffered a drop in income from 760 to 217 dollars. The banks do not 
help us defend our rights, they are not aware of the risks we face”. 
The bank meanwhile does not regret granting him a loan: “He is responsible for his 
over-indebtedness as he hid the truth” says his loan officer. “I think that his priority 
from the start was to repay well with the MFI. It is there that he has a credit history, 
so he wanted to be a good borrower there. Also he may have acted strategically – 
the MFI did not accord him the amount he requested, so he search for cash 
elsewhere. Now he has problems to repay and yes there are late fees. We must 
make sure not to appear too easy-going in the recovery if we want to be taken 
seriously by borrowers. If other FIs are stricter, clients will always pay them first. 
F: Maman Jeanne (Nar15) 
A well organised saleswoman, Jeanne has resorted to rather risky business practices 
in the past: she sells on credit and because of the economic situation some of her 
customers forgo paying; she also travels carrying large amounts of cash to buy 
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merchandise; she has been granted a loan over 20,000 dollars and has had trouble 
repaying for three months; the FI wants to continue working with her – she is an 
important borrower with a good credit history and she is frequently contacted by other 
institutions.  
Ms Jeanne sells furniture and appliances. She has also turned part of her shop into a 
hairdresser. She is currently in her 5th loan cycle with a cooperative: “I began with 
3,500 dollars and now I have reached 20,000. I use the money for customs clearance 
(around 19,000 dollars). I always use the same customs office to avoid problems.” 
“My difficulties began 3 months after receiving the loan. I always sell on credit and 
certain borrowers cannot pay at the moment. Last December all my debtors 
complained about a decline in sales. I trust them though, I have known them for 
some time.” Despite the trust, she has hired someone to retrieve the money for her: 
“to recover the debt, I talk to an accountant. In the past, agents received bonuses for 
every debt recovered but this practice has been suspended by the prime minister and 
now recovery no longer works as well.” 
“Of course the loan officers are on my back for the loan repayment. And in turn I am 
behind my debtors: I know that harassing them doesn’t speed up things but I do it 
anyway just to be doing something. I have paid late fees with the institution, one 
percent of the amount I owe them, every day, and still the debtors don’t repay me.” 
Despite the delay, the cooperative expects to continue the collaboration: “Ms Jeanne 
is an excellent borrower. Her business works well even though she sells on credit. 
She has never had problems like this before. She has assured us that the problem 
will be taken care of and we believe her. Our authorities will attempt to find a solution 
that helps her repay, a rescheduling of debt.” 
The cooperative has good reasons to show some flexibility with this borrower 
because different FIs are courting her: “Almost every day some loan officer will drop 
by to knock on the door and offer good loan conditions. For instance, an officer who 
used to work for the cooperative is now with another institution and called me 
yesterday. This allows me to really compare the conditions”: 
In principal, she is happy with her current loan provider: “I am member of a coopera-
tive. Every year there are meetings in which we discuss the conditions. A longer 
grace period before beginning repayment would help me. I already have to repay 
5,000 dollars before even seeing one dollar in sales returns. The cooperative should 
lower early instalments, these degressive rates are not very beneficial to me.” She 
also has other worries: “I have to deposit 10 percent of my outstanding credit as 
guarantee. On paper they grant me 20,000 dollars but I only get 18,000 effectively, 
the rest is retained from the start. Added to this is my collateral, a property title worth 
100,000 dollars.” Her loan officer summarizes: “A woman like her will need even 
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larger loan balances in order to really earn some money in the next years.” Her 
business practices are the result of analysing different options and respective profits. 
“I carry money with me when I work. One must assess the risk of losing it or it being 
stolen against the charges that a bank will ask for a credit card. For me the risk 
seems worth it.” 
G: Papa Médard (Nar4) 
Misuse of funds after several successful loan cycles; the FI suggested raising the 
amount and the borrower accepted; his business idea failed and now he is in default 
of payment; he hopes to accumulate money by saving rather than accepting dis-
advantageous loan conditions. 
“Mr Médard is in the 4th loan cycle. He always acted correctly, always paid back on 
time”, as his bank’s loan officer recounts. Médard: “I had started with a small loan to 
clear from customs merchandise I bought in Dubai. In the past, loans really helped 
me develop my business. After repaying the debt, my loan officer suggested raising 
the amount, which sounded good to me. I improved in terms of my housing and in my 
business. Now I am working in a different field, selling drinks and offering transport, 
using two minibuses”. But this time there are problems. 
“The real reason for his difficulties is failure to use the money as planned” the loan 
officer explains. “Without informing me he immersed himself into a business in which 
he has no experience: instead of renewing his stock of goods as planned, he bought 
a vehicle for transport. This vehicle broke down and he had to spend much money on 
repairs, on mechanics. With no money on his investment he had serious trouble 
repaying.” 
Médard sees the problems rather in the fluctuation of affairs which stand against the 
rigid loan conditions: “My business is hard to manage. You must be lucky enough to 
find good drivers. Then there is the supply problem: I have contracts with Bralima and 
BrasCongo. It is easy to get BrasCongo products but they are hard to sell. Bralima 
products however sell easily while not always being in stock.” 
His engagement in the financial sector has already caused him problems in the past: 
“Last year I served as guarantor for someone who couldn’t repay so I was charged to 
pay 990 dollars. That hurt, especially because the lenders don’t even think about 
these sort of problems. When you have trouble repaying, the pressure they exert 
does not help. The conditions and the late fees actually make matters worse. I have 
heard that with other banks loan duration can be 3 to 5 years. That is much better 
than here. The repayment system, interest rates, and the duration are not good with 
my current bank. If it raises your loan balance, it should also raise the duration and 
lower the interest rate. It would better if the bank gave you the amount you need. If you 
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need 5,000 dollars for your business they give you 3,000 so you go and try to complete 
the sum by searching elsewhere. That can push you into over-indebtedness.” 
The bank remains unimpressed but is considering continuing the cooperation 
nonetheless, if Médard can prove that he has learnt his lesson. His loan officer says: 
“My first reaction was to show him that I was not happy, to make clear that he has 
broken the contract. Now he must work hard to repay. We will talk to our superiors 
about whether we can reschedule the remaining instalments to facilitate things for 
him. And then we will see how things go on”. 
And what is Médard’s plan? “I am lucky to be employed in an office every day. After 
that job, around 5 or 6 I drive the taxi to be able to repay. I don’t want my children to 
be deprived of anything, neither school nor food. They worry because they know that 
I am in debt. But I am working hard to repay. I don’t understand why the loan officers 
exert such pressure, the bank has tons of money after all!” 
The bad experience and the pressure have made him change strategies: “Microloans 
should help people to escape from poverty. In the past, I though the bank was really 
there to help me. I always explained to those around me that to work with a bank is a 
good thing. But this is the last time I am taking out a loan. And my family has also 
realised that it is not as good as we thought. After repaying I will save to invest in my 
future. Of course I will continue to work hard – but not for the bank – but this time for 
me.” 
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8.2 Theoretical background 
Overview: Schools of Thought  
Year Authors Title Summary 
1999 Morduch The Microfinance 
Promise 
For the most part, high repayment rates do not 
translate into profits and impact studies on poverty 
paint a mixed picture. The promise of microfinance 
has pushed far ahead of the evidence. An agenda 
is put forward for addressing critical empirical gaps 
and sharpening the terms of policy discussion. 
2006 Karlan & 
Zinman 
Expanding Credit 
Access: Using 
Randomized Supply 
Decisions to Estimate 
the Impacts 
First randomized controlled trial study on the effects 
of microfinance: lenders can hone in on their 
sustainability/outreach frontier by taking controlled 
risks using randomized experimentation. Consumer 
credits should be given with caution. 
2008 Gehlich Poverty alleviation or 
poverty traps? 
Microcredits and 
Over the last few years the use of preventive 
mitigation and coping strategies has declined in 
Bangladesh despite a strong presence of MFIs in 
the country. In order to overcome cash shortages 
many people have resorted to borrowing from a 
variety of sources, which has become effectively 
the single most important coping strategy employ-
ed. In conjunction with lowered debt capacity and 
restrictive terms under which microcredits are 
disbursed, higher indebtedness, creating a potential 
for poverty traps, is the outcome. 
2009 Roodman 
& Morduch 
The Impact of 
Microcredit on the 
Poor in Bangladesh: 
Revisiting the 
Evidence 
Studies demonstrating the effectiveness of micro-
finance have failed to rule out external problems. 
We conclude that for non-experimental methods  
to retain a place in the portfolio evaluations, the 
quality of studies must be raised and tested. 
2010 Aggarwal 
& al. 
Vulnerability in 
Bangladesh 
The economic benefits of microcredit have been 
more modest than once assumed. Analyses 
suggest that the poor save to create new busi-
nesses and the introduction of official products for 
small economies can be a key financial innovation.  
2010 Ayayi & 
Sene 
What drives micro-
finance institution's 
financial sustainability? 
MFIs should imitate (profit-seeking) banking 
practices to by implementing sound financial 
management to ensure their financial viability. 
2010 Batabyal & 
Beladi 
A model of 
microfinance with 
adverse selection,  
loan default, and  
self-financing 
There is adverse selection because only borrowers 
know whether their project is of high or low quality 
but the FIs do not. The MFIs are competitive, risk 
neutral, and they offer loan contracts specifying the 
amount to be repaid only if a borrower’s project 
makes a profit. 
2011 Lascelles Losing its fairy dust Immediate risks posed by the global financial crisis 
are gone - but have been replaced by larger 
concerns about the future direction of microfinance. 
2012 Ndongo Microfinance And 
Poverty Reduction: 
Case Study The 
Economic And 
Monetary Community 
Of Central Africa 
Countries 
The ability of microfinance to reduce poverty is not 
supported by sound facts derived from rigorous 
research. Using survey data of nearly 2,000 obser-
vations from six Central African countries, this study 
provides evidence of the positive impact of 
microfinance on productive activities of micro-enter-
prises and the well-being of low-income households. 
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8.3 Information on methodology 
i. End users of the study 
Table 15:  Target group of study 
End user Type of use 
Advans banque, 
Other FIs 
• consumer protection 
• practises of credit disbursement  
• alarm signals 
• risk reduction  reduce risk of losses 
Regulatory institutions (BCC), 
supportive institutions 
(KfW, UNCDF and others), 
network institutions 
• information 
• alarm signals 
• standards against OID and to protect 
borrowers  
MSMEs • consumer protection 
• availability of suitable loan products 
• business management 
International debate • contribution to OID debate 
 
KfW in the DRC: 
The overall goals of KfW’s integrated approach are to establish a stable financial 
system and to raise availability of financial products for MSMEs and poor 
households. To this end, it supports the Congolese central bank (BCC) in 
establishing a credit information system, a key element for financial regulation and 
the prevention of OID; it contributes to the fund for financial inclusion (FPM) which 
offers financial and technical support to FIs. 
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ii. Goals and objectives 
Figure 30: Goals and results of study 
i.  
ii.  
iii.  
iv.  
v.  
vi.  
  
 
 
Overall goal 
The financial sector serving MSME is strengthened in its social and economic 
dimensions. MSMEs and poor households have access to suitable, stable and reliable 
financial products. 
1. Specific objective 
Kfw, the BCC and FIs use 
OID early-warning 
indicators when 
developing financial 
services and regulatory 
mechanisms. 
2. Specific objective 
FIs dispose of criteria to 
select and assess 
borrowers allowing them 
to reduce the risk of OID. 
These mechanisms can 
be based on a code of 
conduct agreed on by 
FIs. 
3. Specific objective 
MSMEs and poor 
households have access 
to suitable financial 
services. Supportive 
services strengthen their 
financial management 
capacities to make sound 
decisions regarding 
loans.
1. Result 
Analysis of the OID risk in 
Kinshasa's financial 
inclusion sector, based 
on indicators to identify 
early-warning signals for 
OID and the development 
of an OID typology. 
2. Result 
Identification and analysis 
of factors on the supply 
side (FIs) that can cause 
OID. 
3. Result 
Identification and analysis 
of factors on the demand 
side (borrowers) that can 
cause OID. 
Identifying of causes for 
OID in financial inclusion 
in general (global scale) 
and in the context of 
Kinshasa 
Verification of 4 
hypotheses 
Identifying of reasons for 
requesting loans, reasons 
for multiple loans and for 
defaulting on payment 
Identification of OID signals – indicators, safeguards 
Definition of OID 
for financial 
inclusion sector 
in Kinshasa. 
Classification of 
OID by degree 
Analysis of the 
status quo of OID 
in Kinshasa 
according to 
PAR30 and 
PAR90 ratios; and 
comparison with 
international level. 
Analysis of loan 
defaults by loan 
balance, economic 
sector and gender
Disseminating 
information on 
the growth of 
financial inclusion 
in Kinshasa and 
on types of loans 
offered 
(business, 
consumer loan)  
KfW, BCC, FIs 
and other 
stakeholders 
know examples 
of good practices 
to reduce the OID 
risk (in Kinshasa 
and selected 
examples from 
abroad) 
Components of results
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iii. Méthodes 
Questionnaire quantitatif : Entretien avec des clients MPME 
Date et heure : 
Équipe d’enquêteurs : 
Commentaires/Observations : 
 
 
Nom de l’institution qui a octroyé le crédit : 
Type d’institution :  banque  IMF  coopérative 
Chiffre d’affaires du créancier (question à poser au chargé de clientèle/agent commercial) 
Durée prévue de l’entretien : 35-45 min 
En italique = instructions pour l’équipe 
 
Faites une bonne introduction pour que l’interviewé se sente à l’aise ! Le premier contact 
peut-être primordial pour un bon déroulement de l’entretien. Clarifiez bien que nous sommes 
indépendants et qu’aucune information délicate ne sera transmise à leur institution 
financière.  
Insistez sur le fait que nous faisons une recherche pour mieux comprendre les dynamiques des 
problèmes de remboursement afin d’assurer une meilleure protection du client, que les 
informations nous aiderons à donner de meilleures recommandations aux institutions 
financières pour mieux servir les clients. 
INTRODUCTION 
L’équipe de chercheur 
Équipe de chercheur de l’université de Berlin et des étudiants en économie rurale ou 
microfinance à Kinshasa  
 
Objectifs de l’étude  
Analyser l’importance du surendettement et développer une typologie du surendettement  
dans le secteur financier servant des MPME à Kinshasa. 
Identifier et analyser les facteurs des côtés de l’offre et de la demande promouvant le 
surendettement. 
Trouver les indicateurs qui permettent l’identification précoce de surendettement. 
Un portefeuille optimisé et une meilleure protection des consommateurs dans le secteur. 
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Anonymisation 
Les résultats de l’entretien seront traités avec confidentialité et rendus de façon anonyme.  
L’équipe de recherche est complètement indépendante des institutions financières. Vos 
réponses n’ont aucune influence sur vos produits de microfinance et sur votre relation avec 
l’institution dont vous êtes les clients. 
En cas de problèmes, donnez mon contact (Erik ; 0815932894) ; La coopération financière 
allemande qui finance l’étude soutient le développement du secteur financier en RDC avec 
l’accord du gouvernement congolais et demande à tous les agents officiels de bien vouloir 
soutenir et faciliter le déroulement de l’étude. 
 
Informations générales personnelles et MPME 
Genre  homme  femme 
Pour la suite, posez la question appropriée pour homme/femme (p.ex : utilisateur/utilisatrice) 
 
Vous avez quel âge?  (Cochez la case correspondante) 
18 – 28 ans  49 – 58 ans  
29 – 38 ans  59 – 68 ans  
39 – 48 ans  Plus de 68 ans  
 
Quel est votre niveau d’études ?  
Universitaire avec diplôme   Secondaire avec diplôme  
Universitaire sans diplôme   Secondaire sans diplôme  Primaire  
 
Quel est votre situation d’état civil ? 
marié(e)  veuf /veuve  
célibataire  union libre  
Combien de personnes sont à votre charge ?  
(enfants et autres personnes qui dépendent de vous) ? ______________________________ 
Précisément, que fait votre entreprise ? __________________________________________ 
 
(Ne pas poser la question : cochez la case correspondante en fonction de la réponse ci-dessus) 
 production     transformation     service     petit commerce      commerce de gros 
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Depuis quand est-ce que vous travaillez dans ce secteur d’activité ? 
Moins d’un an  5-6 ans  
1-2 ans  Plus de 7 ans  
3-4 ans    
 
Est-ce que vous avez des employés salariés  (contrats mensuels, journaliers) ? 
 oui  non  
Si oui, combien ? 
 1  2-5  5-10  > 10  
L’endettement 
L’emprunt 
 
En ce moment, quels types de crédits suivants avez-vous en cours (vous personnellement) ? 
(Plusieurs réponses possibles) 
 
(Micro) Crédit individuel   Crédit en groupe   
 
Quelle était la raison pour demander le(s) crédit(s) ? (Marquez la réponse le plus 
correctement possible) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Aux enquêteurs de cocher la catégorie correspondante   
Crédit d’affaires  Crédit à la consommation 
(immobiliers, véhicules) 
 
Autres 
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Avez-vous d’autres crédits en cours ? 
 oui  non  ne veut pas répondre 
(Si oui) Auprès de qui avez-vous reçu vos autres crédits en cours ?  
(Si ce sont des prêts multiples, cochez plusieurs cases ; notez le nom de l’institution si la 
personne ne connaît pas le type d’institution ; si les personnes reçoivent des crédits de 
différentes institutions, marquez les différentes institutions ; demandez si les personnes 
reçoivent d’autres crédits que celui nommé en premier) ? 
 
 banque : _____________________  IMF : ________________________________ 
 
 coopérative : _________________   prêt d’un membre de famille : _____________ 
 
 Banque Lambert ______________  Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Pourquoi avez-vous choisi cette institution ? (Plusieurs réponses possibles) 
 
Proximité  Je n’en connais pas d’autres  
Conditions favorables  Publicité  
Sur recommandation 
(de qui ?) :______________________ 
 Agent de crédit/chargé de client  
Autres/Commentaire : 
 
 
 
 
L’accès au crédit/aux informations  
 
Était-ce facile ou difficile d’obtenir le(s) crédit(s) ? 
 facile  difficile  indécis (facile et difficile) 
 
Commentaires 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Comment/de qui est-ce que vous avez reçu les informations sur les conditions du crédit/de 
remboursement ? (Ne pas lire les réponses possibles ; si une séance d’information de la 
part de l’institution n’est pas mentionnée, posez la question si elle n’a pas eu lieu) 
 mon chargé de client : 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 lecture des termes du contrat : 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 séance d’information/consultation (formalisée, pendant une séance par l’institution 
financière) :  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 propres recherches :______________________________________________________ 
 bouche à l’oreille : _______________________________________________________ 
 autres : ________________________________________________________________ 
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Est-ce que les conditions de crédit et de remboursement étaient clairement décrites ? 
 ou  non 
Commentaires _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Que prévoit le contrat dans le cas de bon remboursement/retard de remboursement/faillite 
(de non-remboursement) ? 
bon remboursement _________________________________________________________ 
retard de remboursement _____________________________________________________ 
non remboursement/faillite ___________________________________________________ 
 je ne sais pas  je ne veux pas répondre 
 
Connaissiez-vous des gens (famille, amis, quartier) avec des problèmes de remboursement 
avant de prendre le crédit ? 
 oui  non 
Commentaires 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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(Si oui) D’après vous, quelles étaient les causes de ces problèmes ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Avant de prendre le premier crédit, avez-vous participé à une séance d’information de votre 
institution financière?  
 oui  non (continuez avec la question 21) 
 
(Si 18 est « oui ») : Quand est-ce que cette séance a eu lieu ? 
0-1 an  2-3 ans auparavant  
1-2 ans auparavant  Plus de 3 ans  
Je ne sais pas  Je ne veux pas répondre  
 
Avez-vous été satisfait de cette séance d’information ? 
 satisfait  pas satisfait  pas vraiment satisfait 
Commentaires 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Quel était le contenu de cette séance d’information ?_______________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
(Si la personne ne mentionne pas les conséquences de retard de remboursement, posez la 
question suivante) : Est-ce qu’on vous a parlé de problèmes de remboursement lors de la 
séance d’information ? 
 oui   non 
Commentaires 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(À poser aux micro-entreprises): 
Avant de recevoir le crédit, est-ce que l’agent de crédit  
est venu vous rendre visite ?  
(À poser aux petites et moyennes entreprises) :  
Est-ce que vous avez interagi avec votre agent de crédit avant de recevoir le crédit ? 
 oui  non 
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(Si oui) : Combien de fois ? ___________________________________________________ 
(Si oui) : Pour quelles raisons ? ________________________________________________ 
 
Depuis que vous avez reçu le crédit, est-ce que l’agent de crédit est venu vous rendre 
visite ? (Pour les petites et moyennes entreprises) : Est-ce que vous avez interagi avec  
votre agent de crédit depuis que vous avez reçu le crédit? 
 oui  non 
 
(Si oui) : Combien de fois ?  __________________________________________________ 
(Si oui) : Pour quelles raisons ? ________________________________________________ 
 
Est-ce que vous aviez discuté de vos motivations pour demander le crédit avec votre agent 
de crédit ? 
 oui  non  
 
Commentaires 
_________________________________________________________________________  
 
Est-ce que vous avez reçu le montant que vous aviez demandé ? 
 oui  non  je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre  
 
Si non : pourquoi pas ? ______________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Crédit individuel 
 
Quel était le montant du premier crédit ?    USD __________________________________ 
 Je ne sais pas              ne veut pas répondre 
 
Quand est-ce que vous avez touché votre premier crédit ?  
________________________ mois ______________ année 
 Je ne sais pas              ne veut pas répondre 
 
Combien de fois avez-vous reçu un crédit avec cette institution ? _____________________ 
 
Quel est le montant du crédit actuel (USD) ? _____________________________________ 
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Quand est-ce que vous avez touché le crédit actuel ?  
______________________ mois ______________ année 
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Quelle(s) garantie(s) avez-vous donnée(s) pour obtenir le crédit ? 
(Plusieurs cases peuvent être cochées) 
 garanties matérielles : ____________________________________________________ 
 avaliseur :___________  compte d’épargne 
 pas de garantie  je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Quel est le taux d’intérêt du crédit actuel ?_______________________ ________________
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
(Pour les personnes qui ne connaissent pas le taux d’intérêt en %) :  
Sur le crédit actuel, combien devrez-vous rembourser au total ? ________________USD 
 Je ne sais pas    ne veut pas répondre 
 
De combien de mois est la durée du crédit actuel? _________________________________
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
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Comment est-ce que vous avez dépensé les crédits ? (Plusieurs réponses possibles) 
Investissement entreprise  
(actifs immobilisés) 
 Épargne  
Investissement entreprise 
(marchandises) 
 Voyage d’affaires  
Santé (ménage/foyer)  Alimentation foyer  
Éducation  Achats personnels    
Immobilier  Remboursement d’autres 
crédits 
 
Frais d’administration (patente, registre, impôts…)  
Dépenses « sociales » (festivités, voyages familiaux, soutien matériel famille 
éloignée, …) 
 
Dépenses inattendues 
Lesquelles :  
 
Autres : 
 
 
 
(S’ils ont fait plusieurs dépenses) En termes de montant des dépenses : Quelle était la plus 
grande dépense, la deuxième plus grande et la troisième plus grande dépense ? 
1. 
2. 
3.  
 
Est-ce que ces dépenses étaient planifiées? 
 oui  non  en partie 
 
Si non ou seulement en partie : Pourquoi (pas) ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Si vous avez dévié du plan : l’avez-vous signalé à votre institution ? 
 oui   non  
 
Commentaires 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Est-ce que votre ménage a d’autres crédits en cours ? 
 oui, on a ____________ (nombre de crédits) avec ___________________ (fournisseur) 
  non  Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
(Plusieurs réponses possibles) 
 avec une institution financière   prêt d’un membre de famille 
 Banque Lambert  autre ______________________________ 
Crédit en groupe formel (si la personne a un crédit en groupe en cours, posez les 
questions suivantes, MÊME si la personne avait aussi un crédit individuel) : 
Combien de membres sont dans votre groupe de crédit ? ____________________________ 
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Depuis quand votre groupe de crédit existe-t-il? ___________________________________ 
 Je ne sais pas   ne veut pas répondre 
 
Quel est le montant du crédit actuel (USD)? ______________________________________ 
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Depuis combien de mois utilisez-vous le crédit actuel ? _____________________________ 
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Quelle(s) garantie(s) avez-vous donnée(s) pour obtenir le crédit ?  
(Plusieurs cases peuvent être cochées) 
 garanties matérielles:___________________  caution solidaire 
 avaliseur:____________________________  épargne 
 pas de garantie  je ne sais pas   ne veut pas répondre 
 
Quel est le taux d’intérêt du crédit actuel ?_______________________ 
 Je ne sais pas   ne veut pas répondre 
 
 (Pour les personnes qui ne connaissent pas le taux d’intérêts en %)  
Sur le crédit actuel, combien devrez-vous rembourser au total ?   USD _________________ 
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
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De combien de mois est la durée du crédit actuel ? (mois) ___________________________
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Quand est-ce que vous avez touché votre premier crédit ? 
(Si le crédit actuel est aussi le premier, ne posez pas la prochaine question) 
_______________________ mois ______________ année 
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Quel était le montant du premier crédit ?    USD __________________________________ 
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Combien de fois avez-vous touché un crédit en groupe ? ____________________________ 
 
Comment est-ce que vous avez dépensé les crédits ? (Plusieurs réponses possibles) 
Investissement entreprise 
(actifs immobilisés) 
 Épargne  
Investissement entreprise 
(marchandises) 
 Voyage d’affaire  
Santé (ménage/foyer)  Alimentation foyer  
Éducation  Achats personnels    
Immobilier  Remboursement d’autres 
crédits 
 
Frais d’administration (patente, registre, impôts…)  
Dépenses « sociales » (festivités, voyages familiaux, soutien matériel famille 
éloignée, …) 
 
Dépenses inattendues 
Lesquelles :  
 
Autres : 
  
 
 
(S’ils ont fait plusieurs dépenses) En termes de montant des dépenses : Quelle était la plus 
grande dépense, la deuxième plus grande et la troisième plus grande dépense ? 
1. 
2. 
3.  
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Est-ce que ces dépenses étaient planifiées? 
 oui  non  en partie 
Si non ou seulement en partie : Pourquoi (pas) ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Si vous avez dévié du plan : l’avez-vous signalé à votre institution ? 
 oui  non  
Commentaires 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Est-ce que votre ménage a d’autres crédits en cours ? 
 oui, on a ____________ (nombre de crédits) avec ___________________ (fournisseur) 
  non  Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
(Plusieurs réponses possibles) 
 avec une institution financière    prêt d’un membre de famille 
 Banque Lambert   autre __________________________ 
 
Gestion de finances/connaissances financières 
 
Comment faites-vous votre comptabilité ?  
Livre de caisse/comptabilité  Comptable  
Autres  ________________________________ 
 
Avez-vous reçu des formations en gestion d’entreprise ? 
  oui, par  ________________________________________  non 
  oui, par (apprentissage, expériences dans l’entreprise familiale) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
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Le remboursement 
 
Combien de jours après l’octroi du crédit deviez-vous commencer à rembourser ? 
 ___________________  Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Avec quelle fréquence est-ce que vous devez rembourser ?  
 hebdomadaire  mensuelle  autre fréquence : ___________ 
 irrégulièrement  Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Quels sont les montants que vous devez rembourser à chaque fois ?  
_________________________________________________________________________  
 Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
 
Est-ce que l’institution vous accorde de la flexibilité concernant la fréquence et le montant à 
rembourser ? 
Fréquence  oui  non  Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
Montant  oui  non  Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
Commentaire : 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Avec quoi payez-vous les dettes ? 
Rendements d’entreprise  Épargne  
Salaire   Soutien par d’autres personnes 
du ménage 
 
Soutien par d’autres personnes de la 
famille/par des amis/voisins… 
 Autres crédits  
Autres 
 
 
 
Y a-t-il d’autres sources de revenu dans votre ménage? 
 oui   non  Je ne sais pas  ne veut pas répondre 
Commentaire : _____________________________________________________________ 
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Combien est-ce que vous touchez en moyenne par mois (profit de l’entreprise ; salaires ; 
transferts de membres de famille/d’amis) ?  
Si l’interlocuteur donne son profit par jour, par semaine, par an : faites le calcul sur place 
pour avoir un chiffre valable par mois ;  
s’il y a des différences entre les mois, demandez pour les bons/mauvais mois ; 
si les interlocuteurs ont des problèmes à calculer les montants : essayez en demandant les 
montants individuels par source de revenu. 
Marquez les montants dans le tableau ci-dessous. 
S’il y a des différences entre les mois, demandez pour les bons/mauvais mois. 
 Nombre de mois Revenu individuel (en dollar) 
Bon mois   
Mauvais mois   
 
Après toutes vos dépenses fixes est-ce que vous arrivez à mettre de l’argent de côté ?       
 oui  non  Je ne sais pas  Je ne veux pas répondre 
 
Si oui, combien et avec quelle fréquence ? :  
___________USD par ___________ (jour, semaine, mois) 
 
Ici commencent les questions concernant les problèmes de remboursement. Il faut peut-être 
évoquer une fois l’utilisation des données, l’anonymat des réponses etc. pour que les 
interlocuteurs soient à l’aise. Vous pouvez aussi mentionner que nous sommes venus chez 
eux parce que sur les listes des institutions financières, ils sont listés comme « clients à 
risque ». 
 
Avez-vous connu, ces 2 dernières années, des problèmes de remboursement ? 
 oui, actuellement   oui, mais c’est résolu  Non 
 Je ne sais pas  Je ne veux pas répondre 
 
Pourquoi ?  __________________________________________________________ 
(Si oui) : Quand est-ce que les problèmes de remboursement ont commencé ?   
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Afin de pouvoir rembourser le crédit ou afin de rattraper le retard de remboursement, êtes-
vous obligé de (lire toutes les réponses) :  
Travailler plus  Utiliser l’épargne  
Économiser en renonçant à des 
achats 
 Économiser en mangeant 
moins 
 
Vendre des actifs du ménage  Prendre d’autres crédits  
Déscolariser le(s) enfant(s)  Emprunter de l’argent  
(famille, amis) 
 
Économiser en ne payant pas 
les employés 
 Économiser en employant 
moins de journaliers 
 
Déménagement  Autres ____________________________ 
 
Est-ce que vous considérez cela (réponses à la question précédente) acceptable/tolérable ? 
 oui  non 
Pourquoi/pourquoi pas ? _____________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Est-ce que vous vous considérez vous-même comme surendetté ?  
(Ressentez-vous le poids du crédit ?) 
 oui  non 
Pourquoi/pourquoi pas ? _____________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Quelles sont pour vous (outre les sacrifices mentionnés plus haut) les conséquences de ce 
surendettement ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Pratiques de récupération des dettes 
 
Comment est-ce que les institutions sanctionnent le retard de remboursement ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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En cas de retard, comment est-ce que les institutions procèdent pour récupérer l’argent ?  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Trouvez-vous ces pratiques de récupération de dettes adéquates ?  
 oui  non 
Pourquoi ? ________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(S’il y a eu d’autres crédits) Est-ce que les différents créanciers ont différentes pratiques de 
récupération des dettes ? 
 oui  non 
Commentaire : 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Conclusion 
 
Est-ce que vous utilisez d’autres services financiers à part votre crédit? 
 oui    non 
 
Si oui, lesquels ? 
Transfert  Banque mobile  
Épargne   
Autres _________________________________________________________________ 
 
Est-ce que vous regrettez d’avoir pris un crédit/plusieurs crédits ? 
 oui  non  Je ne sais pas  Je ne veux pas répondre 
Pourquoi ? ________________________________________________________________ 
 
Si votre voisin vous pose la question, est-ce que vous lui conseilleriez de prendre un crédit 
avec la même institution que la vôtre ? 
 oui   non  Je ne sais pas   Je ne veux pas répondre
Pourquoi ? ________________________________________________________________ 
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Clôture : 
Un dernier message/une dernière information que vous tenez à partager avec nous ? 
Est-ce que vous avez des questions pour nous ? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Ne demander ceci que s’il s’agit d’un cas intéressant (cas typique, cas extrême, personne très 
ouverte) 
Nous voudrions bien discuter davantage avec vous afin de mieux comprendre les  
circonstances de votre situation. Est-ce que nous pourrions vous contacter pour une discussion 
en groupe ou pour un autre interview plus approfondi et plus informel, peut-être aussi avec  
1-2 personne(s) de votre famille, vos amis, voisins ? 
 
Si oui :  
Nom : ___________________________ Numéro de tél. : ____________________________ 
 
Nous vous remercions. 
Durée de l’entretien : __________________________minutes 
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Questionnaire standardisé pour les chargés de clientèle/les agents de crédit/ 
les agents commerciaux 
Date  
Position  
Institution  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Objectifs de l’étude :  
Analyser l’importance du surendettement et développer une typologie du surendettement dans 
le secteur financier orienté vers les MPME à Kinshasa. 
Identifier et analyser les facteurs des côtés de l’offre et de la demande promouvant le 
surendettement. 
Trouver les indicateurs qui permettent l’identification précoce du surendettement. 
 
Anonymisation 
Les résultats de l’entretien seront traités avec confidentialité et rendus de façon anonyme. 
L’équipe de recherche est complètement indépendante des institutions financières. Vos 
réponses n’ont aucune influence sur vos produits de microfinance et sur votre relation avec 
l’institution dont vous êtes client. 
 
Comment remplir le questionnaire 
Nous vous prions de bien vouloir répondre à toutes les 30 questions posées. 
Vous verrez des options de réponses standardisées avec des cases à cocher – sauf si indiqué 
différemment, ne cochez qu’une seule case. 
Certaines questions prévoient des réponses ouvertes ou des commentaires – SVP décrivez en 
peu de mots les points les plus importants à retenir. 
Nous vous remercions d’avance pour votre coopération. 
 
Informations générales  
Genre  homme  femme 
Type d’institution financière chez laquelle vous êtes employé(e) ? :  
 banque  IMF  Ccoopérative 
Ça fait combien de temps que vous travaillez comme chargé de clientèle/agent 
commercial/agent de client?   
(Cochez la case correspondante) 
Moins d’un an  1-2 ans  3-4 ans  
5-10 ans  Plus de 10 ans  
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Développement des crédits 
Quel est le montant du crédit de vos clients ?   
En moyenne : _____________ USD  
De _________ USD à ____________ USD (minimum et maximum) 
 
Est-ce que le montant moyen a changé ces dernières années ? (cochez une seule case) 
 non, resté pareil  augmenté  diminué  
 je ne sais pas  je ne veux pas répondre 
 
Si la moyenne du montant a changé, pour quelle raison ? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Est-ce que la marge des montants a changé ces dernières années ? (Cochez une seule case) 
 
 non, restée pareille  a augmenté  a diminué  
 je ne sais pas  je ne veux pas répondre 
 
Si la marge a changé, pour quelle raison ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Combien de clients sont à votre charge ? ________________________________________ 
 
Est-ce que le nombre de clients à votre charge a changé ces dernières années ? 
(cochez 1 seule case) 
 non, resté pareil  augmenté  diminué  
 je ne sais pas   je ne veux pas répondre 
 
Si le nombre a changé, pour quelle raison ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Est-ce que vous visitez les clients dans leurs entreprises ?  
 oui   non  je ne sais pas  je ne veux pas répondre 
Si oui : combien de fois, en moyenne, par mois ? _________________________________ 
 
Combien d’heures passez-vous avec un nouveau client, en moyenne, AVANT l’accord du 
crédit ?___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Combien d’heures passez-vous avec un nouveau client, en moyenne, APRÈS l’accord du 
crédit à chaque visite ? ______________________________________________________ 
 
Quels sont les facteurs primordiaux pour le recrutement de nouveaux clients ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Est-ce que votre institution vous accorde des bénéfices pour des rendements particuliers ? 
 oui  (précisez) ___________________________________________________________  
 non  je ne sais pa  je ne veux pas répondre 
Comment est-ce que votre performance est évaluée par vos supérieurs ?  
(Marquez les critères les plus importants en premier)  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Selon votre impression : est-ce qu’il y a plus de pression sur le marché financier en raison 
d’une compétition accrue entre les institutions ? 
 oui  non  je ne sais pas  je ne veux pas répondre 
Commentaires 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Conditions des crédits 
Comment vous assurez-vous qu’un nouveau client a bien compris les conditions de 
crédit/de remboursement ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Quelles garanties demandez-vous avant d’octroyer un crédit ? (Plusieurs réponses 
possibles) 
 garanties matérielles:_____________________________________________________ 
 avaliseur:________   pas de garantie    je ne sais pas    ne veut pas répondre 
 
Récupération de crédits 
En général, comment est-ce que les remboursements sont effectués ?  
 Client passe chez nous      Nous passons chez le client     Virement électronique 
Autre : ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Qu’est-ce que vous faites concrètement quand un client est en retard de remboursement ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 ça ne m’est jamais arrivé  je ne sais pas  je ne veux pas répondre 
 
Qu’est-ce que vous faites concrètement quand un client ne peut pas rembourser (faillite) ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 ça ne m’est jamais arrivé  je ne sais pas  je ne veux pas répondre 
 
D’après vous, y aurait-il de meilleures façons de réagir au non-remboursement ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Conclusion 
Est-ce que votre institution vous a offert des formations ? (si oui, en quoi ?) 
 oui : (précisez) __________________________________________________________   
 non 
Quelle était la durée de la formation ? 
En salle _______________________ mois 
Accompagnement par des formateurs sur le terrain _____________________ mois 
Coaching ______________________ mois 
Avez-vous travaillé pour une autre institution financière avant de prendre votre poste 
actuel ? 
(Si oui) : laquelle ? __________________________________ 
(Si oui) : quelles étaient les raisons principales pour changer ? _______________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Quel est votre niveau d’études ? 
Universitaire avec diplôme  Secondaire avec diplôme  
Universitaire sans diplôme  Secondaire sans diplôme  Primaire  
 
Avez-vous une proposition pour améliorer le secteur financier pour les MPME ? (si vous en 
avez plusieurs, marquez les trois que vous croyez les plus importantes, svp). 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Clôture : 
Un dernier message/une dernière information que vous tenez à partager avec nous ? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Nous vous remercions infiniment 
L’équipe SLE. 
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Questionnaire qualitatif : Exemple Direction IF 
Documents/données 
• Est-ce que vous pourriez partager avec nous votre rapport annuel 2013 avec  
des donnéesclés ? (Gamme de produits, PAR30, nombre d’agences, d’agents 
commerciaux). 
• Documentation des différences relatives au surendettement en fonction des 
secteurs économiques, des montants des crédits, du genre ?  
• Le rapport annuel de votre institution 2013 (si vous pouvez le partager avec nous) 
avec le PAR30 et le PAR90. 
• Des données statistiques (sans les noms) : 
o Type de crédit 
o Montants de crédit 
o Cycle de crédit 
o Taux d’intérêt 
o Genre 
o Niveau d’éducation 
o Ponctualité de remboursement 
o Client à risque oui/non 
o Secteur  
o Objectif du crédit (plan d’investissement)  
• Comment ceci se compare au niveau global ? (Bilans de IF/rapports annuels  
(non publiés)) 
• Est-ce que vous pouvez partager avec nous des données de clients anonymes 
contenant montant, cycle, secteur économique, détails de remboursement (taux 
d’intérêts, ponctualité)… ? 
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Direction IF 
Surendettement  
en général 
− Quelle est votre définition du surendettement ? 
− Est-ce que vous considérez les défauts de remboursement/le 
surendettement comme un problème pour votre agence/vos clients ? 
− Quelles sont les causes et raisons pour la présence/l’absence de 
surendettement chez vos clients ? 
− Quels sont les montants moyens des prêts aux MPME dans votre IF ?  
Ya-t-il des tendances (orientation vers PME, orientation vers micro…) ? 
Quelles en sont les raisons ? Quels sont les plus petits montants, quels sont 
les plus grands montants de crédits ? 
− Est-ce que ce sont plutôt les micro, les petits ou les moyens entrepreneurs 
qui ont des problèmes de remboursement ? 
− D’après vos analyses, est-ce que certains types de crédits sont plus aptes 
aux problèmes de non-remboursement (crédit à la consommation, crédit en 
groupes, crédit individuel, crédit après plusieurs cycles…) 
− D’après vos analyses, est-ce que certaines agences sont plus affectées  
par des problèmes de non-remboursement ? Si oui, quelle est votre 
explication ? 
Compétition 
− Est-ce que vous ressentez une concurrence accrue parmi les institutions 
financières orientées vers les MPME ? 
− Quelles sont les réponses de votre institution à cette concurrence (expansion 
géographique vers des régions non-couvertes, élargissement de 
l’offre/produits de crédit, nouvelle technologie) ? 
− Comment est-ce que vous vous assurez que vos produits soient appropriés 
et compétitifs (études de marché, membre d’association professionnelle) ? 
− Comment est-ce que vous évaluez la performance des différentes agences ? 
Analyse client  
et précautions 
− Avez-vous des politiques internes pour l’analyse des clients ? 
− Avez-vous accès à des informations sur des clients potentiels par la centrale 
de risque existante ou par des contacts informels avec d’autres IF ?  
− Que faites-vous – à long terme – pour réduire l’importance du 
surendettement ? (analyse des cas d’impayés, évaluation interne ; 
évaluation externe ; publications du secteur) ? 
− Quels sont vos mécanismes de caution, signaux d’alarmes et garde- fous 
pour dépister les débuts de surendettement? 
Information 
− Est-ce que vous encouragez le développement et le partage d’expériences 
au sein des membres du personnel de crédit ? Si oui, comment ? 
− Promouvez-vous l’éducation financière du personnel ? Si oui, comment ? 
Supervision 
− Est-ce que vous avez une politique interne pour les conditions et objectifs de 
travail des agents commerciaux/agents de clients ? Ou est-ce que ce sont 
les directeurs d’agences qui définissent les objectifs et le ratio 
clients/chargés de clients ? 
− Faites-vous des analyses approfondies, comprenant des visites sur le 
terrain, des diagnostics commerciaux et des contrôles pour assurer les 
bonnes pratiques des employés ? 
− Faites-vous des audits internes pour détecter d’éventuelles violations de la 
politique de votre institution (sélection et évaluation du client et adhésion au 
code de conduite) ? 
− Est-ce que vous encouragez le développement et le partage d’expériences 
au sein des membres du personnel de crédit ? Si oui, comment ? 
− Soutenez-vous la formation continue du personnel ? Si oui, comment ? 
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iv. Additional data 
Figure 31: Perception of OID 
 
 
v. Analysis 
Explanation of index 
A borrower can experience repayment problems for several months without consider-
ing him-/herself over-indebted. Or the opposite can occur: he/she may have solved 
the problems but still consider him-/herself over-indebted. To balance the two 
aspects we suggest joining the two values together to a single factor in the final 
multiplication. 
  
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Banques
Coopec
IMF
total
Perception of OID
oui non
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vi. Work schedule 
Table 16:  Overview: course of the study 
Week Dates Activity  
1. Preparatory phase in Berlin 
1-6  09.12.2013-
12.01.2014 
Analysis of the literature, inception report, preparation and 
organising Kinshasa research phase  
2. Kinshasa research phase 
6-9 13.01.-
27.01.2014 
Arrival, meetings with KfW, Advans, kick-off workshop, 
recruitment of Congolese research assistants, workshop with 
assistants, finalisation of questionnaires  
9-10 27.01-
07.02.2014 
Borrower interviews, expert interviews, interviews with FI 
representatives 
11 07.02.-
13.02.2014 
Focus group discussions and narrative interviews 
11 14.02.2014 Final workshop in Kinshasa 
3. Analysis and draft report 
 24.02.-
19.03.2014 
Data analysis, drafting of report 
 20.03.-
25.03.2014 
SLE presentation, final workshop at KfW 
 26.03.-
04.04.2014 
Incorporation of comments, finalising report 
 04.04.-
04.05.2014 
Revision, translation and printing of report 
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